Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2012

Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the
World Trade Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico
Alvaro Santos
Georgetown University Law Center, asantos@law.georgetown.edu

© 2012 by the Virginia Journal of International Law Association. For reprint permissions, see
http://www.vjil.org.
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/885
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030966

52 Va. J. Int'l. L. 551-632 (2012)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

VIRGINIA JOURNAL
OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW
O

Y

VI

U N I V ERS

T

F

I

Volume 52 — Number 3 — Page 551

RGI NI A

18 1 9

Article

Carving Out Policy Autonomy
for Developing Countries in
the World Trade Organization:
The Experience of Brazil & Mexico
Alvaro Santos

© 2012 by the Virginia Journal of International Law Association. For
reprint permissions, see http://www.vjil.org.

Carving Out Policy Autonomy for
Developing Countries in the World Trade
Organization: The Experience of Brazil and
Mexico
ALVARO SANTOS*

Although liberal trade and development scholars disagree about the merits of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), they both assume that WTO legal
obligations restrict states’ regulatory autonomy. This Article argues for relaxing
this shared assumption by showing that, despite the restrictions imposed by
international economic law obligations, states retain considerable flexibility to
carve out policy autonomy. The Article makes three distinct contributions.
First, it analyzes how active WTO members can, through litigation and
lawyering, influence rule interpretation to advance their interests. Second, the
Article redefines the concept of “legal capacity” in the WTO context and
introduces the term “developmental legal capacity,” which describes how states
can use legal tools and institutions not only as a sword to open new markets but
also as a shield for heterodox economic policies. Third, the Article offers a
comparative analysis of two case studies, Brazil and Mexico, and shows that
they have pursued different trade and litigation strategies. While subject to the
same WTO obligations, these countries have made different use of their policy
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space according to their own economic objectives. The Article concludes that,
despite the apparent rigidity of the WTO, countries following a deliberate
strategy can expand their regulatory space to advance their own interests.
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INTRODUCTION
As countries around the world responded to the 2008 global financial
crisis with economic stimulus and rescue packages, a vigorous debate
developed in the rich North Atlantic countries about the role of the state
in the market. In the United States, the government bailout of several
financial institutions, the rescue of the American car manufacturers, and
the start of several investment and spending projects seemed to inaugurate
a greater role for the state in the economy. For a brief period of time, it
seemed as though the strong belief in markets and the aversion to active
state participation had crumbled and a paradigm shift in economic thought
had taken place. Although this proved to be a temporary illusion and the
parameters of the public debate have shifted dramatically since then, the
crisis initiated a worldwide debate about the virtues and limits of the
market. This debate had been going on for years in the context of
developing countries — what was different this time was that a grave
economic crisis originated in and affected the rich industrialized countries
directly. This time, the debate and the reform policies that followed would
have immediate consequences on the economies of the rich countries.
The global financial crisis also threw the World Trade Organization
(WTO) into the limelight and reenergized a vigorous debate between two
main positions, which I call the “liberal trade” and “development”
positions. Liberal trade scholars defend the WTO as an institution that can
bring prosperity and increase economic welfare in the world. Development
scholars, on the other hand, criticize the WTO for curtailing developing
countries’ policy autonomy and hindering their ability to undertake the
kind of policies that wealthy countries undertook to become rich.
Interestingly, although liberal trade and development scholars disagree
about the merits of the WTO, they both share an assumption that the
WTO effectively restricts a state’s capacity to regulate in favor of its own
domestic economic interests; the difference is that the former group
celebrates this condition and the latter bemoans it.
In this Article, I examine and challenge the assumptions of the two
main positions in the debate. Development scholars argue that by
imposing tight legal restrictions the WTO system hinders poor countries’
prospects for economic growth. As I will show, however, many of the
legal restrictions are open-ended and remain in flux through constant
interpretation. While there are important limits set by the architecture of
the WTO and the asymmetry of power between its members, there is
flexibility within the system to expand developing countries’ regulatory
autonomy beyond what is currently recognized. By the same token, I
challenge the liberal trade scholars’ assumption about the WTO as a rulebased system providing a level playing field and equality of opportunity
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between members in the WTO dispute settlement system. I show that
there are important structural asymmetries that disfavor developing
countries. Thus, while attainable, policy space is expensive and above all,
requires a deliberate strategy.
This Article seeks to make three distinct contributions to the literature
of trade and development. First, it offers a legal-institutional analysis of the
WTO to shed light on the open-endedness of legal obligations and on how
active members can influence rule interpretation over time to advance
their interests through effective litigation and lawyering. The terms of
WTO legal obligations are still contestable; this Article highlights the
conditions under which countries can exploit this ambiguity and suggests
several avenues by which to do so. While scholars have studied countries’
rates of participation and success in WTO litigation, I examine this
participation in a dynamic way, looking at the rules in flux and at favorable
rule-change over time. I argue that a country’s success in WTO litigation
should not be measured by the number of cases it has won or lost. Often,
a country can lose a case but still obtain a favorable interpretation of a rule
so that it can ultimately modify its domestic measures to suit its domestic
needs. Thus, what is relevant is how countries — mostly repeat players —
manage to change rule interpretations to advance their domestic economic
policies within the confines of the WTO legal regime.
Second, this Article seeks to broaden the concept of “legal capacity” in
the WTO law literature by analyzing its importance from a new
perspective. Scholars use the idea of legal capacity to account for the
perceived difficulties that developing countries face in participating in the
WTO dispute settlement system to their advantage. Because of the
complexity of WTO litigation, developing countries often lack the legal
skills and resources to effectively advance their interests within the system.
This Article suggests that the current understanding of legal capacity is too
limited as it continues to rely on the assumption that its overarching goal is
to deepen trade liberalization. In contrast, I introduce the concept of
“developmental legal capacity,” which acknowledges that trade law can be
both a sword to open markets and a shield for heterodox policies.
Countries that actively pursue heterodox development policies are also
more likely to invest in their local legal capacity and to rely on it to
advance their national policy goals.
Finally, I offer a comparative analysis of two cases studies, Brazil and
Mexico, to explore how two developing countries pursue their
development objectives within the trade legal regime. These countries have
the two largest economies in Latin America, are active participants in the
global market, and have the highest participation rates in WTO cases in
the region. But, while these countries are similar in many ways, their
participation in the WTO shows two divergent trade and development
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strategies. Mexico pursues a policy of trade liberalization while Brazil
focuses more actively on state promotion of domestic industries and
economic actors within the international trade system. These positions are
in turn reflected in these countries’ participation in the WTO system and
the domestic institutions that support it. This comparative analysis shows
that active participation in the WTO on its own does not guarantee greater
policy autonomy. A country needs to carve out this space deliberately,
which requires a great degree of training, coordination, and institutional
capability. Ultimately, a country will be able to expand its policy autonomy
only if it links its legal capacity to a deliberate domestic development
strategy.
Beyond these contributions, this Article seeks to intervene in the
literature on the emergence of a New Developmental State, which
proposes that the neoliberal economic model is making way for an
alternative paradigm.1 This emergent model presupposes a more active
role for the state in the market, but differs significantly from the old
Developmental State and the dirigiste practices of the past. The
characteristics of this emerging model remain unclear and it currently
amounts more to a set of policies than to a coherent whole. By analyzing
Brazil’s experience in the WTO and highlighting the institutions and
strategy behind its relative success, I suggest that Brazil may very well be,
along with other emerging countries like China and India, the harbinger of
a new economic model. By analyzing this case study, I explore what the
trade policy of such a New Developmental State might look like.
This Article is divided in four parts. In the first part, I examine the
debate over the WTO restrictions on countries’ policy autonomy and
argue that liberal trade and development scholars alike underestimate the
flexibility of the regime. The second part analyzes the legal restrictions
introduced by the WTO and the barriers that have arisen when using the
exceptions. I argue that while the WTO is more restrictive than the
previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime, there
is policy space to be gained within the WTO agreements. In the third part,
I examine the legal and doctrinal space available to countries in the
interpretation of WTO agreements that are open-ended. I show that active
participants in the system are influencing rule interpretation and using the
system’s procedures to their advantage through strategic lawyering and
litigation. The experience of rich countries and a few middle-income
countries shows that repeat players can expand their policy space to favor
their interests. I analyze the type of “developmental legal capacity” and
domestic institutional capability that is needed to pursue this strategy.
1. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, The Political Economy of the Rule of Law: The Challenge of the New
Developmental State, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 28, 30 (2009); F. Charles Sherman, Law and Development
Today: The New Developmentalism, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1257, 1258–59 (2009).
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Lastly, in the fourth part I analyze the cases of Mexico and Brazil
contrasting their divergent strategies of participation in the WTO. The
analysis shows that developing countries can carve out important space for
their domestic development objectives.

I.

THE DEBATE ABOUT POLICY AUTONOMY IN THE WTO

The creation of the WTO in 1995 has been hailed as a phenomenal
achievement. The organization introduced a new trade regime by
expanding the GATT and, in effect, inaugurating a new era of
unprecedented global economic integration. The organization stood as the
institutional embodiment of an economic model predicated on free
markets and free trade being key to social and economic prosperity. In the
1990s, former communist countries and developing countries flocked to
the organization with great expectations for economic growth. The WTO
has effectively reduced trade restrictions around the world, integrating
domestic markets and unleashing production and consumption gains from
specialization and trade.
Institutionally, the WTO has become the envy of international
organizations for its effectiveness and, above all, for its enforcement
capacity. It is no surprise that scholars and policymakers would like to use
the WTO as a forum to deal with a variety of challenging global issues, like
the environment, labor, immigration, and health.2 Nor should it be a
surprise that many advocates of and players in the WTO resist such
expansion because they view it as a threat to its efficacy and legitimacy.3
Finally, the WTO can boast a slim profile in a world of international
organizations that look unnecessarily large, wasteful, and ineffective by
comparison.
The WTO regime is often perceived as having moved the trade system
from a power-oriented diplomacy toward a rule-oriented diplomacy.4
Consequently, it is also perceived to be more restrictive than its GATT
predecessor. In fact, the motivation behind the WTO was to create an
institution that would encourage countries to decrease their trade barriers
and that would enforce countries’ commitments. In order to achieve these
results, it was necessary to curtail domestic government measures that
would serve as effective equivalents to tariff barriers and hinder trade
liberalization commitments. To ensure this end, the original trade regime
has been transformed into a complex legal regime with more effective
2. See, e.g., Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).
3. Id.
4. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (2006); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 97 (2d ed. 1997).
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institutions (most notably a dispute-settlement body) to enforce existing
international obligations.5 In this Section, I outline the liberal trade and
development scholars’ debate about the desirability of these restrictions on
the policy autonomy of developing countries.

A.

Liberal Trade vs. Development Scholars

Although there is a general consensus that the WTO is more restrictive
as compared to GATT, there remains disagreement over whether these
new institutional constraints are desirable. Liberal trade scholars argue that
the WTO has been a success in terms of increase in global trade and gains
to global economic welfare.6 They note, however, at least two important
aspects in which the WTO could be improved. First, liberal trade scholars
suggest that developed countries fail to truly embrace the goals of the
WTO when they herald trade liberalization by developing countries, yet
considerably restrict access to sectors of their own markets, such as the
agricultural and textile sectors. Considering that many developing
countries have a comparative advantage in these sectors, liberal trade
scholars argue that developed countries should reduce their farm subsidies
and eliminate other trade restrictions in agricultural and textile goods.7
Second, liberal trade scholars advocate providing aid and greater
technical assistance to developing countries, so they can fully participate in
and take advantage of the existing trade regime.8 These proposals stem
from a conviction that developing countries would benefit from fully
participating and complying with the WTO system. Instead of granting
developing countries substantive exceptions to the rules the WTO should
aid them to become active participants in and take full advantage of the
system.9
5. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a key example of the trend towards courts and
judicialization globally. This phenomenon is salient in international law and international
organizations, with the proliferation of judicial and quasi-judicial institutions. For a characterization
of this practice as part of a broader event in global legal consciousness, legal reasoning and legal
institutions, see Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (describing a third globalization of legal thought, originating in the United
States, with judges and adjudication as a centerpiece).
6. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 60–67, 261 (2004); MARTIN
WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 206–12 (2004). It should be noticed that both authors point
to limitations of the WTO.
7. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 212–16.
8. See, e.g., BHAGWATI, supra note 6, at 235–36 (arguing that the World Bank should have a special
aid program to compensate developing countries when they bear significant losses in income and
market access as a result of unfavorable rulings in the WTO dispute settlement).
9. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. The declaration, which
is the most explicit WTO recognition of developing countries’ concerns, emphasizes the importance
of technical cooperation and capacity building as “core elements of the development dimension of
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In contrast, development scholars argue that the WTO does not serve
well the interests of developing countries. They argue that trade
liberalization has become the main objective of the WTO at the expense
of economic development.10 The WTO’s success, they argue, should not
be measured by the increased volume of global trade, but by its effects on
member countries’ economic development.11According to this view, the
WTO regime and those who manage it have mistaken the means (trade
liberalization) for the goal (development).12 Thus, development scholars
seek to change the WTO’s focus from asking what it can do to encourage
countries to open their markets to how countries should use the existing
trade regime to foster economic growth and improve living standards
around the globe.13 While they criticize developed countries’ reluctance to
end their subsidies and open their markets in agriculture and textiles,
development scholars do not see this liberalization, even if it were to
happen, as the key to developing countries’ growth.14
Developing countries signed up to the WTO chasing its promise of
economic growth and better living standards. Development scholars argue,
however, that trade liberalization alone has not, and cannot, deliver on this
promise.15 Today’s industrialized and rapidly-growing developing countries
achieved economic growth by embracing heterodox strategies that
combined policies of government support and selective trade
liberalization.16 Development scholars argue that, if the WTO’s aim is truly
the multilateral trading system” ¶ 38.
10. See DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 213–36 (2008); DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX:
DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 76–84 (2011); see also HA-JOON
CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF
CAPITALISM 65–83 (2007); HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1–12 (2002); NARCÍS SERRA & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2008);
RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 61–102 (2006); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON,
FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: HOW TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT (2005); Robert Wade, What
Strategies are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The WTO and the Shrinking of Development Space, 10
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 621, 621–31 (2003).
11. See, e.g., RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 233–36.
12. See id. at 227–28.
13. See id. at 233–36.
14. See id. at 222–23; Nancy Birdsall et al., How to Help Poor Countries, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug.
2005, at 136.
15. See CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10, at 65–83; CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE
LADDER, supra note 10, at 1–9; RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 216–
25; RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX, supra note 10, at 159–83.
16. See CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10, at 40–64; CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE
LADDER, supra note 10, at 1–9; RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 13–55.
See generally ALICE AMSDEN, THE RISE OF “THE REST”: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATEINDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (2001); ROBERTO UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED (2007);
ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF
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to promote economic development, then the trade regime should give
developing countries more policy space to support domestic economic
activities and promote industrial policies.17
At its most general level, this is a debate about whether the neoliberal
development model, with its staunch support for free markets and free
trade, even in its more moderate form, holds promise for developing
countries. It would be wrong to characterize this debate simply as one
between free trade versus protectionism. At the core of this debate there is
a disagreement about whether trade liberalization is the main engine for
economic growth and whether it should be the main organizing principle
of the international trade regime. Consequently, it is also a debate about
what institutional form the WTO should take, how much space it should
give member countries to promote their own industries and what form
this promotion should take.
This Article does not attempt to adjudicate this debate. But, it is
important to note that there is a wealth of theoretical and empirical
critiques challenging the relationship between free trade and economic
growth which was taken for granted when the WTO was created.18 In
addition, many countries that pursued orthodox free trade policy as a
development strategy have not fared well whereas countries that followed
unorthodox policies have done better.19 Thus, looking at the current state
of the academic and policy debate it is possible to conclude that the
relationship is inconclusive at best. These critiques have undermined the
confidence in the neoliberal model and triggered attention to other
potential determinants of economic growth such as domestic institutions.
At the same time, the critiques have ignited a new interest in industrial
policy now gradually taken seriously by international development

GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1992).
17. See RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 122–52; RODRIK, THE
GLOBALIZATION PARADOX, supra note 10, at 67–88; Dani Rodrik, How to Save Globalization From Its
Cheerleaders, J. INT’L TRADE & DIPL. 1, 9–11 (2007); see also CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10,
at 203–22; STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 10, at 61–102; Wade, supra note
10, at 621–23, 636–38.
18. See, e.g., RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 13–55; SERRA &
STIGLITZ, supra note 10; Francisco Rodríguez & Dani Rodrik, Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A
Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence, in 15 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 2000 (Ben S.
Bernanke & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 2001); Francisco Rodríguez, Openness and Growth: What Have We
Learned? 2 (United Nations Dep’t. of Economic & Social Affairs, DESA Working Paper No. 51,
2007); see also Barcelona Development Agenda, City of Barcelona, available at
http://tinyurl.com/7n28gdn (issued by several development scholars after the 2004 Barcelona
Forum).
19. See CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10, at 67–78; RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY
RECIPES, supra note 10, at 35–44; STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 10, at 61–
102; Birdsall et al., supra note 14; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Is there a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?, in
THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED, supra note 10, at 43–45.
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institutions, like the World Bank,20 and generating discussion in developed
countries.21

B.

Structural vs. Pragmatic Development Scholars

While development scholars agree that trade liberalization is not a
development strategy on its own and countries should have regulatory
space to pursue industrial policies, they disagree as to whether the current
WTO framework is an impediment and should be reformed. It is possible
to identify a division between two groups of development scholars, which
I refer to as “structural development scholars” and “pragmatic
development scholars.” On one hand, structural development scholars
argue that the WTO and its web of agreements were implemented
precisely to prevent countries from undertaking the type of trade and
industrial policies carried out successfully by the states in East Asia.22 In
this view, the WTO reflects the economic interests of rich countries and
undermines the ability of poor countries to create their own industries,
develop technology, and strengthen their domestic markets.23 The WTO,
the argument goes, institutionalizes a systematic double standard, whereby
rich countries lock in their competitive advantage, making it practically
impossible for poor countries to pursue the kind of strategies they
undertook to become rich.24 Accordingly, the legal regime inaugurated by
the WTO has come at the expense of countries’ policy autonomy and their
development prospects.25 Thus, developing countries should coalesce to
20. The World Bank’s chief economist has recently advocated for the use of industrial policy. See
Justin Yifu Lin, New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development 23 (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 5197, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/7rg7krk (recognizing an
important role for goverments in economic policy, though stating that the government’s role “should
be limited to the provision of information about the new industries, the coordination of related
investments across different firms in the same industries, the compensation of information
externalities for the pioneer firms, and the nurturing of new industries through incubation and
encouragement of foreign direct investment,” and the provision of infrastructure).
21. Philippe Aghion et al., Industrial Policy and Competition 2 (Growth and Sustainability Policies for
Eur., Working Paper No. 17, 2011) (“[W]e argue that the debate on industrial policy should no longer
be ‘existential’, i.e., about whether sectoral policies should be precluded altogether or not, but rather
on how such policies should be designed and governed so as to foster growth and welfare.”). See also
the debate organized by The Economist titled “Industrial Policy: This house believes industrial policy
always fails,” wherein Dani Rodrik debated Josh Lerner against The Economist’s position and got
seventy-one percent of the public’s vote, at http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/177.
22. See, e.g., CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER, supra note 10; Ha-Joon Chang, The Future for
Trade, CHALLENGE Nov./Dec. 2003, at 6, 11; Wade, supra note 10, at 630–31, 638.
23. Id.
24. Robert Wade and Ha-Joon Chang have called this “kicking away the ladder,” following
German economist Friederich List’s analysis, in the 1840s, about the behavior of nations that had
industrialized through trade protection but were preaching free trade. See CHANG, KICKING AWAY
THE LADDER, supra note 10, at 3–5, 127–28; Wade, supra note 10, at 630–32.
25. See CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER, supra note 10; Wade, supra note 10. From a
different perspective, the WTO has enabled active state policies, but of the kind needed only by
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repeal or change the most restrictive rules, such as those prohibiting
subsidies, restricting investment conditions or imposing stringent
intellectual property protection.26
On the other hand, pragmatic development scholars agree the WTO is
constraining but, as Alice Amsden has remarked, its “bark is worse than
the bite.”27 These scholars argue that the main obstacle for developing
countries is one of political vision, still very much under the influence of
liberal trade tenets, not of law.28 Although the WTO rules may make it
harder for developing countries to climb it, the ladder has not been kicked
away. Developing countries can still use several policy mechanisms that
countries that successfully industrialized under the old GATT regime
enjoyed.29 Pragmatic development scholars point out that many of the
mechanisms of protection under GATT can be continued even if under a
different legal form. For instance, while voluntary export restraints
(VERs) — a popular form of protection under GATT — are no longer
allowed, countries could still increase tariffs up to their bound levels to
protect their industries.30 In addition, countries have at their disposal, and
are now using, other types of mechanisms to protect their industries, such
as non-tariff barriers and anti-dumping measures.31 Moreover, countries
can resort to safeguards in emergency situations to help an industry in
distress; they can also use exceptions that allow them to increase tariffs to
address balance of payments problems and to support infant industries.32
Similarly, although there is a new Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, it does not seem to be too stringent in practice, enabling

industrialized countries. See Linda Weiss, Global Governance, National Strategies: How Industrialized States
Make Room to Move Under the WTO, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 723, 729 (2005).
26. See, e.g., CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER, supra note 10, at 144; Birdsall et al., supra
note 14, at 144 (“[R]ich countries cannot just amend TRIPS [The WTO’s Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights]; they must abolish it altogether . . . .”); Ha-Joon
Chang, Trade and Industrial Policy Issues, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 10,
at 257, 269–73; Wade, supra note 10, at 624.
27. See Alice H. Amsden & Takashi Hikino, The Bark Is Worse Than the Bite: New WTO Law and
Late Industrialization, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., July 2000, at 104, 110; Alice H. Amsden,
Promoting Industry under WTO Law, in PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY
SPACE IN THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Kevin P. Gallagher ed.,
2005); see also Peter Evans, Neoliberalism as a Political Opportunity: Constraint and Innovation in Contemporary
Development Strategy, in PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST, supra.
28. Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 105. Rodrik agrees with Amsden on the lack of “vision”
but argues that “current WTO regulation do preclude many of the strategies that were usefully
employed by the East Asian countries.” RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10,
at 226.
29. Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 105.
30. Id. at 108–09 (stating that many developing countries have legally retained high tariff ceilings,
even if their prevailing rates are inferior).
31. Id. at 109.
32. Id. at 110.
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developing countries to maintain their local content requirements in
important sectors.33
Finally, although export subsidies have been prohibited, and other
subsidies are subject to action by affected states upon proof of injury, the
WTO originally allowed a number of permissible subsidies related to
research and development, regional development, and the environment.34
Even though these permissible subsidies have officially expired,35 many
countries continue to use them.36 Additionally, export subsidies remain
available for least-developed countries, those countries with per capita
income below $1000.37 Thus, these scholars conclude that beyond export
subsidies, “there is nothing in WTO law that prevents other countries
from promoting their nascent industries and subjecting them to
performance standards.”38
It is important to underscore that these positions I have outlined are
ideal-types and are located in a continuum, so that there is certain
overlap.39 There is, for example, wider consensus about the restrictiveness
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights.40 Although development scholars may differ in their perception of
33. Id. at 109; Moreover, WTO law has also been quite lax in its enforcement of sprawling freetrade agreements, formally only an exception of multilateral non-discriminatory obligations. Amsden,
supra note 27, at 219; Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 109.
34. Amsden & Hikino,, supra note 27, at 110.
35. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 27.2(a), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]. These non-actionable subsidies were included in Article 8 of the SCM
Agreement. According to Article 31, however, these provisions were initially valid for five years after
the entry into force of the WTO agreement in 1995 and, although subject to extension, they have not
been renewed. An important question is, of course, whether countries would challenge each other on
these types of subsidies, even if they were now actionable.
36. Amsden, supra note 27, at 221 (arguing that making research and development subsidies illegal
“would put the national innovation systems of all developed countries out of business.” Similarly,
Europe and the United States use regional development subsidies extensively.)
37. SCM Agreement, supra note 35, at art. 27.5.
38. Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 108.
39. Initially, Chang seemed to agree with Amsden on the potential flexibilities of the WTO,
claiming that the “constraints are not completely overwhelming as many people assume” and that
important leeway remains for those who want to use it. Chang, supra note 26, at 269. However, in
later scholarship, Chang seems firmly placed in the position holding that WTO rules overtly restrict
industrial policies:
In the name of ‘leveling the playing field’, the Bad Samaritan rich nations have created a
new international trading system that is rigged in their favour. They are preventing the
poorer countries from using the tools of trade and industrial policies that they had
themselves so effectively used in the past in order to promote their own economic
development — not just tariffs and subsidies, but also regulation of foreign investment and
‘violation’ of foreign intellectual property rights.
CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10, at 77–78. Moreover, “many of the exceptions to the rules
were created in areas where the developed countries needed them.” Id. at 76.
40. Chang and Wade are harsh critics of TRIPs. So are many other development economists. See
supra note 26. Amsden estimates that TRIPs importantly limits the strategies of the “late
industrializers,” although it is unclear how it affects poorer “potential industrializers.” Alisa di Caprio
& Alice Amsden, Does the New International Trade Regime Leave Room for Industrialization Policies in the
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how much the WTO restricts developing countries’ space to promote
selective trade and industrial policies, they share much common ground.
A common trait between the structural and pragmatic development
scholars, however, is that both tend to take rules and exceptions at face
value as if they imposed clear, fixed and stable limits on states’ actions.
The problem with this approach is that it underestimates the existence of
“gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities” in the legal materials that leave room for
legal and institutional change.41 In this Article, I suggest that an evaluation
of WTO constraints needs to be complemented by an analysis of the
“rules in flux” and the institutional practices developed in the WTO.
Whereas development scholars often take what I would call an external
look at the WTO regime, this Article does an internal legal/institutional
analysis. Once this perspective of the WTO is adopted, it becomes clear
that there is more room for policy autonomy than is often apparent.
Using this approach, this Article’s analysis will adopt the strengths and
expose the weaknesses of the three positions described above. While the
Article retains the liberal trade interest in law as an important mechanism
for economic change and for potentially mutually beneficial transactions, it
rejects the assumption that given law’s formal neutrality all economic
outcomes are merely the reflection of each country’s economic merit.
Similarly, my analysis retains the structural development scholars’ interest
on the asymmetry of power and resources among different countries, but
it rejects the notion that law, and more specifically the WTO regime, is
merely epiphenomenal, mechanically or inexorably mimicking the current
balance of global power amongst different countries. My analysis attempts
at once to recognize more agency and freedom of developing countries’
governments, often denied by structural development scholars, while
Middle-income Countries?, (ILO, Working Paper No. 22, 2004), available at http://tinyurl.com/89yaamm.
Criticism of TRIPS goes beyond development scholars. Liberal trade scholars Bhagwati and Wolf
have also criticized the inclusion of TRIPS in the WTO. Bhagwati has stated that “TRIPS should not
be in the WTO at all.” BHAGWATI, supra note 6, at 185. According to Bhagwati, the agreement relies
on no serious economic justification and actually harms developing countries. In his view, TRIPS is
the result of successful lobbying of software and pharmaceutical companies. These companies have
“turned it into a royalty-collection agency simply because the WTO can apply trade sanctions.” Id. at
182; see also WOLF, supra note 6, at 216–17.
41. For a classic analysis of the indeterminacy of law and legal materials, and the law-making
work judges do in resolving questions for which there is often no clear or “correct” answer, see
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE 28–30 (1997) (examining the
ideological character of adjudication and challenging the distinction between legislation and
adjudication, which is often a form of denying that the work of judges is ideologically based,
particularly when stakes are high). For the purposes of my argument, it suffices to show that the
work of law-making continues after the rules in the agreement have been “settled.” Both litigating
parties (countries) and judges (panelists and Appellate Body members) will be actors in the ensuing
change. The direction of the transformation can go in a variety of ways. See JOEL TRACHTMAN, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (2008) (analyzing international dispute
resolution as a hybrid of adjudicative and legislative authority. Trachtman argues that the
“indeterminacy, incompleteness, or standard-like nature” of treaty provisions may be regarded as a
legislative decision and “a form of implicit delegation to dispute resolution.”).
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pointing out important asymmetries in the operation of the legal regime
that adversely affect those countries with less power and resources,
commonly disregarded by liberal trade scholars. Finally, this Article retains
the pragmatic development scholars’ interest in existing WTO flexibilities
available for developing countries, but it eschews a formalist and static
understanding of how the WTO legal system operates. My analysis looks
more closely at the rules in action and at how strategic actors help to shape
and transform these rules over time.

II.

THE WTO LIMITS ON COUNTRIES’ POLICY AUTONOMY

In this Part, I examine a number of key differences between the former
GATT and the WTO regimes. I analyze both the new restrictions
introduced by the WTO on subsidies, intellectual property, and investment
as well as the opt-out clauses incorporated from the old GATT system.42 I
conclude that, even though there is an important reduction in juridical
space since the creation of the WTO, there is still more room for
maneuvering than is currently appreciated.

A.

Restrictions

The creation of the WTO in 1995 introduced new significant
restrictions within the international trade regime.43 First, subsidies are now
subjected to greater scrutiny and many forms of government support to
domestic industries, such as export subsidies and local content
requirements, are prohibited.44 These restrictions are more onerous than in
42. See Chantal Thomas & Joel Trachtman, Editors’ Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN
WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 1–20 (Chantal Thomas & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009) (analyzing several
areas in which the WTO may constrain regulatory space for development). In addition to the
imposition of new substantial obligations, development scholars argue that the variety of exceptions,
opt-out mechanisms, and special clauses used by countries under the GATT regime have become
harder to use under the WTO. In their view, the WTO has unduly burdened the ability of developing
countries to enact policies that proved instrumental in the success of countries like Japan and the
Asian Tigers in the twentieth century. See Chang, The Future for Trade, supra note 22, at 11; Wade, supra
note 10, at 630.
43. Member countries agreed to use tariffs as the main form of trade barrier, gradually eliminating
quotas and other forms of non-tariff barriers. Simultaneously, they agreed to decrease tariff levels. As
a result, quantitative protections were largely reduced. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 423 (5th
ed. 2008).
44. The new Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)
considerably increased the reach of disciplines for government action. See SCM Agreement, supra
note 35. The pre-Uruguay Round GATT regime did not have comprehensive subsidies rules and
gave countries greater discretion to use them for export promotion and import substitution. U.N.
Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], Trade and Development Report, 2006: Global Partnership and
National Policies for Development, at 169–70, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2006, U.N. Sales No.
E.06.II.D.6 (Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 2006]. The
WTO subsidies regime applies to subnational governments, government firms, and private
enterprises carrying out government functions. Id. at 170. The agreement prohibits export subsidies
THE

2012]

POLICY AUTONOMY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

565

the previous GATT regime where countries regularly used export subsidies
and local content conditions as part of their industrialization strategy.45
Second, the WTO has introduced new regulations on intellectual
property under TRIPS. Most notably, countries are now required to grant
patent protection to all fields of technology and extend the duration of
protection to twenty years.46 The current TRIPs regime may be contrasted
to earlier conditions, under which not only late industrializers but even the
United States and the European Union developed.47 These countries grew
while having lax intellectual property laws that enabled domestic producers
to appropriate technology and reproduce it.48 This process of technology
transfer helped domestic firms to gradually move up in the value-added
chain of production and ultimately created a pool of technologically
advanced domestic producers, which generated spill-over effects in the
rest of the economy. By establishing more stringent protections on
copyright, patents and trademarks, the current WTO regime under TRIPS
has in effect made it harder and costlier to appropriate technology.49
(conditioned on export performance) and local content requirements (conditioned on the use of
domestically-produced goods). Prohibited subsidies do not even require a demonstration of injury to
be challenged. Id. The agreement further creates a two-tier classification of subsidies, dividing them
into specific subsidies and non-specific ones. Id. Specific subsidies are actionable and parties may
challenge them through multilateral dispute settlement or countervailing duties. Id. The challenging
party is required to show injury and causal connection to the measure in question. Id. The new
classification of subsidies as specific makes it hard for countries to use selective policies to target a
firm or industry. Id. In contrast, non-specific subsidies are not affected by the agreement. Id. These
subsidies are general and are deemed not to distort the allocation of domestic resources. Id. They
typically involve resources for the provision of infrastructure that in principle benefit all enterprises.
Id.
45. Development scholars have shown how important export subsidies and local content
requirements were for countries industrializing in the second half of the twentieth century, “late
industrializers” such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. These countries used export
subsidies to stimulate domestic production and subject national firms to the discipline of
international competition. See, e.g., PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES & INDUSTRIAL
TRANSFORMATION (1995). In addition, the implementation of export performance standards was a
key mechanism in East Asia’s industrial policy because it limited support to those firms that were
able to compete internationally, thereby reducing the risks of abuse and rent-seeking. UNCTAD
Trade and Development Report, 2006, supra note 44, at 171. At the same time, local content
requirements stimulated the creation of domestic firms that could supply inputs for the products of
foreign firms. This mechanism established linkages in the domestic market between foreign firms
dedicated to export and domestic producers, who acquired new technology needed to supply the
foreign and usually more technologically advanced-firms. See, e.g., CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE
LADDER, supra note 10; AMSDEN, supra note 16.
46. UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 2006, supra note 44, at 172.
47. See B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 56–57, 260 (“[It is] more
than a little ironic that today the United States is at the forefront of efforts to compel developing
countries to forego ‘piracy’ and to recognize foreign [patents].”).
48. See Nagesh Kumar, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic Development: Experiences of
Asian Countries, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 209, 214 (2003) (analyzing the role of technology imitation
in the economic development of Japan and the Asian Tigers).
49. RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX, supra note 10, at 199.
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Finally, as to restrictions on foreign investment, the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)50 limits the use of
government measures that are incompatible with the non-discrimination
principle of national treatment and prohibits the use of quantitative
restrictions.51 As a result, performance requirements, which were
commonly used by the late industrializers to link foreign investors with
domestic manufacturers, such as local content regulation, export
performance, and foreign exchange balancing rules are now forbidden in
the WTO.52

B.

Exceptions

In addition, there are a number of exceptions and opt-out clauses that
have survived from the GATT regime. The WTO trade regime
contemplates safeguards, special and differential treatment rules, and
balance of payments exceptions that are still in place. However, these
exceptions have become harder to use.
50. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter
TRIMS].
51. The main WTO agreements include two principles of non-discrimination; one is known as
“most-favoured-nation” (MFN), and the other is the principle of national treatment. Under MFN, a
country is obliged not to discriminate between its various trading partners. Under national treatment,
a country is obliged to treat imported products in the same fashion as products produced in its own
territory. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I (MFN), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; GATT, supra, at art. III (national treatment).
52. Development scholars have shown that many successful countries used these regulatory
mechanisms to increase domestic value added, generate income, create jobs, and transfer technology.
See, e.g., CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER, supra note 10. While the Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures (TRIMS) does not clearly define “trade-related investment measures,”
it does provide an illustrative list of forbidden regulations in the Annex, including regulations on local
content and trade balancing requirements. TRIMS, supra note. 50. Already TRIMS commitments
have successfully been invoked by developed countries in a number of cases against developing
countries, particularly in the automobile industry. All trade-related investment measures have been
brought by developed countries against developing countries, with exception of Canada, which has
also been sued. See, e.g., Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Philippines —
Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector, WT/DS195/3 (Oct. 13, 2000); India —
Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146 (Complainant: E.C.) (Oct. 6, 1998), India —
Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector, WT/DS175 (Complainant: U.S.) (June
1, 1999); Indonesia — Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS 64 (Complainant: Japan)
(Nov. 29, 1996), WTO/DS59 (Complainant: U.S.) (Oct. 8, 1996), WTO/DS55 (Complainant: Japan)
(Oct. 4, 1996), WTO/DS54 (Complainant: E.C.) (Oct. 3, 1996); Brazil — Measures Affecting Trade and
Investment in the Automotive Sector, WTO/DS81 (Complainant: E.C.) (May 7, 1997), Brazil — Certain
Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, WTO/DS65 (Complainant: U.S.) (Jan. 10,
1997), WTO/DS52 (Complainant: U.S.) (Aug. 9, 1996), Brazil — Certain Automotive Investment
Measures, WTO/DS51 (Complainant: Japan) (July 30, 1996); Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry, WTO/DS142 (Complainant: E.C.) (Aug. 17, 1998), WTO/DS139 (Complainant:
Japan) (July 3, 1998). Although the most important investment restrictions stem from bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) that many developing countries have entered into, TRIMS seems to have
further reduced governments’ scope for policy action. See generally DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S
PROMISE (2008).
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First, consider safeguards. The WTO reformulated the safeguards
provision in GATT Article XIX under a new Safeguards Agreement that
was designed to eliminate the use of “grey-area measures.”53 The goal of
the Safeguards Agreement is to formalize the requirements for an escape
clause — temporarily suspending a GATT obligation — while subjecting
safeguards to greater transparency and stricter conditions. This safeguard
mechanism, however, has proven to be hard to use. No country invoking a
safeguards measure has ever been able to pass muster under the WTO
Appellate Body (AB)’s scrutiny.54 Instead, as a result of this largely
inflexible interpretation of WTO safeguards requirements, countries have
resorted to other measures, such as anti-dumping and other “unfair trade”
laws, that provide similar relief.55
53. Countries used mechanisms like voluntary export restraints (VERs) or marketing agreements
to relieve their domestic industries of import pressure. These mechanisms were part of the GATT’s
“grey-area measures,” which enjoyed an ambiguous legal status; they contravened the GATT’s legal
commitments, but these mechanisms were largely tolerated and remained generally outside the
purview of the GATT and its dispute settlement mechanism. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 691.
Although developed countries frequently resorted to these mechanisms, they were also used by late
industrializers to promote their domestic industry. Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 108; For an
analysis of the restraints, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Grey Area Trade Policy and the Rule of Law,
2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 22, 22–44 (1988).
54. See Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence 2 (Univ. Chi. Inst. for
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 187, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=415800 (arguing
that the Safeguards agreement does not clarify the meaning of the legal prerequisites under GATT
Article XIX because it does not offer guidance on concepts such as “increased imports” as a causal
variable, on alternative factors simultaneously causing injury — “factors other than imports” — or
on the precise contours of the “serious injury” concept itself). For an analysis of the legal constraints
and jurisprudence on safeguards, as well as an economic critique, see Alan O. Sykes, THE
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS: A COMMENTARY (2006). Despite the interpretive problems of
Article XIX, the elimination of gray-area measures has substantially increased members’ use of the
Safeguards provision. From 1995 to 2010, 216 safeguards investigations were initiated and reported
to the WTO Committee on Safeguards, leading to 101 safeguard measures. Safeguard Measures,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://tinyurl.com/7ysxf54 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
55. Anti-dumping duties are high on the list of these measures. Some scholars argue that antidumping has become the functional equivalent of the grey-area measures of the pre-WTO era. See,
e.g., Chad P. Bown, Why Are Safeguards in the WTO So Unpopular, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 47, 51 (2002).
In contrast to the Safeguards agreement, the WTO’s anti-dumping procedure offers a more
“managed trade” or negotiated compromise to trade disputes, similar to the more informal,
diplomacy-based atmosphere of the old GATT. Id. at 53; Patrick A. Messerlin, Antidumping and
Safeguards, in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE 159, 159–83 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (discussing the
impact of antidumping measures on trade law and policy and suggesting reforms in the arena of
antidumping measures).
In the context of global economic integration, countries often need to make trade policy
adjustments and thus need to resort to escape valves. Safeguards would be a more effective way to
deal with these issues because they provide governments with a formal, institutionalized tool by
which to address the problems that their domestic constituencies face in an overly competitive
market resulting from an influx of foreign imports. Safeguards can be viewed as part and parcel,
rather than anomalies of, liberalizing domestic economies. For a proposal to use safeguards to
advance explicit development goals, see RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10,
at 230 (“[C]ountries may legitimately wish to restrict trade or suspend existing WTO
obligations . . . for reasons going beyond competitive threats to their industries . . . . Developmental
priorities are among such reasons, as are distributional concerns or conflicts with domestic norms or
social arrangements in the industrial countries.”). Rodrik has proposed to recast the Safeguards
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Second, the WTO has provided for special and differential treatment
(SDT) provisions, as encapsulated in the “enabling clause.”56 The SDT
category is a big umbrella, encompassing a variety of provisions in several
agreements. These provisions seek to advance developing countries’
interests by providing market access, requiring WTO members to protect
the interests of developing countries, granting flexibility in rules and
disciplines involving trade measures, allowing longer transitional periods,
and providing technical assistance.57 SDT provisions recognize that
developing countries stand on an unequal position vis-à-vis developed
countries and are aimed at fully incorporating developing countries into
the trade regime by providing them with several kinds of formal
advantages.
Although the WTO recognizes SDT provisions, they are much more
limited in scope than those allowed under the old GATT regime.58 Under
GATT, the two most important principles of SDT rules were preferential
treatment and non-reciprocity.59 Preferential treatment, which is an
exception to the non-discrimination principle, allowed members to give
special market access to developing countries. Additionally, under the nonreciprocity exception, developing countries were allowed to provide less
than full-reciprocity to other GATT member states.60 These exceptions
amounted to legal recognition of the unequal footing of developing
countries and gave them some legal space to pursue their national
development policies while taking advantage of the trade regime.61 Under
the WTO regime, in contrast, SDT provisions have been designed more
narrowly, primarily to increase transition periods and provide technical
assistance so that developing countries can implement and comply with
the new WTO obligations.62
agreement into an agreement on “Developmental and Social Safeguards.” Such an agreement would
expand the scope of the safeguards, recast the current “serious injury” test and even replace it with a
requirement that the measure be supported by broad domestic support “among all concerned
parties.” Id. at 230–31.
56. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, ¶ 2(a), GATT Doc. L/4093 (Nov. 28, 1979), B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) 203 (1980).
57. Manickan Supperamaniam, Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in the World
Trade Organization, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: POLICY APPROACHES 130 (Gary P.
Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 2008). Committee on Trade and Development, Note by the
Secretariat: Special and Differential Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, at 1, WT/COMTD/W/135
(Oct. 5, 2004).
58. See Constantine Michalopoulos, Special and Differential Treatment: The Need for a Different
Approach, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO, supra note 57, at 110.
59. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 154–83
(2d ed. 2010).
60. This means a country was not under the obligation to provide the same concessions it
acquired from another country. GATT, supra note 51, at art. XVIII bis.
61. UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 2006, supra note 44, at 167.
62. Id.; see also Frank Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 291, 291–93 (2004). There are important criticisms to the special and differential treatment
(SDT) provisions, both for their limited scope and ineffectiveness. Scholars have pointed out that
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Finally, the WTO’s approach towards the use of the “balance of
payments” exception is significantly more limited as compared to the old
GATT regime. During the GATT regime, countries used the balance of
payments exception quite often to enact trade restrictions to safeguard
their external financial position and prevent a decline in monetary
reserves.63 The WTO regime incorporated a Balance of Payments
Understanding64 that restricted the use of trade measures to deal with
balance of payment problems.65 Furthermore, the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB)66 has given great deference to the IMF in the interpretation of
the meaning of “development policy,”67 which has resulted in the dismissal
of any trade restrictions, enacted in response to balance of payments
problems, whenever there are macroeconomic policies that can also
address these imbalances. This deference thus effectively constrains the
use of trade restrictions as a tool to balance payments, even when a
country may prefer it to macroeconomic policies that would have more
dire social and economic results.68
As highlighted in the preceding discussion, it is possible to observe a
reduction in the legal space and domestic policy autonomy that had been
available to developing countries under GATT in the form of safeguards,
SDT provisions, and balance of payment exceptions. Notwithstanding
these new restrictions, however, I argue in the next Part that, developing

technical assistance funds are insufficient and that the WTO Secretariat lacks the necessary capacity
to provide them. In addition, existing transition periods seem arbitrary and unrealistic given the
physical and human resources involved in setting up the institutions needed to ensure
implementation and compliance. Developing countries also complain about the lack of compliance to
the “best endeavors” rules by developed countries. See, e.g., Mari Pangestu, Special and Differential
Treatment in the Millennium: Special for Whom and How Different, in THE WORLD ECONOMY: GLOBAL
TRADE POLICY 2000, at 195 (Peter Lloyd & Chris Milner eds., 2000); Donald McRae, Developing
Countries and the ‘Future of the WTO,’ 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 603 (2005); Indeed, in the Doha Declaration,
WTO members agreed to review all SDT provisions to clarify them, strengthen them, and increase
their effectiveness. Doha Declaration, supra note 9, ¶ 44.
63. See GATT, supra note 51, at arts. XII–XIV.
64. Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 208.
65. Robert Howse, Pursuing Sustainable Development Strategies: The Case of the Balance of
Payment Rules in the WTO 16 (2005), available at http://tinyurl.com/7d96g4r (last visited on Mar.
18, 2012) (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law Association).
66. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is established in the Dispute Settlement Understanding
in Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement. The DSB is comprised of the WTO General Council sitting
under a separate chair, and it governs all disputes arising under the WTO agreement. JACKSON ET
AL., supra note 43, at 267–68.
67. Howse, supra note 65, at 19. See Appellate Body Report, India — Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R, ¶ 149 (Aug. 23, 1999) (holding
that the Panel had not delegated “its judicial function to make an objective assessment of the matter”
despite giving “considerable weight” to the views of the IMF); Panel Report, India — Quantitative
Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999).
68. Howse, supra note 65, at 19.
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countries can exploit existing flexibilities and carve out more space in
which they can promote domestic economic policy.

III. COUNTRIES’ ABILITY TO CARVE OUT POLICY AUTONOMY
Considering the restrictions analyzed in the previous Part, it would be
tempting to conclude that developing countries would likely benefit from
changing the WTO rules to make them more compatible with their
development objectives. The Doha Development round, which embodies
the most ambitious development agenda in the WTO to date, to some
extent follows this route by seeking changes in the WTO rules that would
benefit developing countries. Indeed, there has been considerable scholarly
attention to negotiations in WTO Ministerial meetings and the emergence
of developing country coalitions that could successfully change current
WTO rules to improve the lot of the developing world.69 Given the
current political impasse that has arisen as a result of competing interests
between developed and developing countries, however, the likelihood of
the Round’s success and its implications for the WTO are widely
debated.70
In this Part, I focus instead on the opportunities for expanding policy
autonomy71 that lie in rule change through lawyering and litigation
strategies to alter the interpretation of existing rules. Whereas the literature
has paid significant attention to the travails of trade negotiations and the
opportunities that lie therein,72 the prospects of gaining terrain in dispute
settlement remain underappreciated. Moreover, while progress in political
69. See, e.g., Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48
HARV. INT’L L.J. 483 (2007) (assessing how the WTO institutional structure encourages coalitions of
developing countries).
70. See, e.g., HIGH LEVEL TRADE EXPERTS GROUP, The Doha Round: Setting a Deadline, Defining a
Final Deal: Interim Report — JANUARY 2011 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Peter Sutherland co-chairs, 2011),
available at www.voxeu.org/reports/doha-round.pdf; Jagdish Bhagwati, An Open Letter to President
Obama on Doha, AM. INT. (Sept. 6, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/7l2ujev; Dani Rodrik, Don’t Cry for Doha,
PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 4, 2008), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rodrik22;
Dani Rodrik, Let the Doha Round Fail, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Nov. 21, 2005), http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/rodrik13.
71. For existing scholarship on policy space within the WTO, see generally Bernard Hoekman,
Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 8 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 405 (2005); MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS & SUSY FRANKEL (EDS.),
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY (2010); Michael Ming
Du, The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 639
(2011). For a different perspective, see ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER
NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011) (arguing that the
question should not be about whether the WTO can grant more policy autonomy to states — it
cannot meaningfully do so — but rather what type of governance and values should prevail in the
trade regime, and how those choices should be subject to debate and deliberation).
72. See, e.g., Sonia E. Rolland, Redesigning the Negotiation Process at the WTO, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 65
(2010).
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branch of the WTO has stagnated, activity in the judicial branch has
proceeded at a fast pace, making this a crucial area of engagement in the
trade regime. Although reforms of WTO agreements by member countries
in Ministerial negotiations are undoubtedly important, these efforts need
to be complemented by strategic engagement in the WTO litigation
sphere.
In the discussion that follows, I first describe the insights that can be
gleaned about strategic litigation from legal-sociological literature in the
context of the WTO. I analyze how active WTO members influence rule
interpretation and use the system’s procedures to their advantage. Second,
I examine the available legal and doctrinal space under which national
regulatory measures could still pass muster, given the gaps, conflicts, and
ambiguities in the text of the WTO agreements. Finally, I explore the
requisite legal capacity and domestic institutional capability that countries
seeking to implement institutional change must develop. Although gaining
policy space in this way has generally been the domain of rich countries, a
number of developing countries have begun to follow suit.

A.

Opportunities Arising From Strategic Lawyering

1.

In Theory

Dispute settlement is perhaps the most prominent feature of the WTO
today and the DSB its most active branch, even when the rate of disputes
per year has decreased since the first eight years of the system.73 While in
the initial years rich members, and particularly the United States and the
European Union, were by far the most active players, developing nation
participation has increased significantly.74 Scholars have looked at the
incidence of participation by developed and developing countries and
pondered what accounts for the lower rates of participation by developing
countries.75 In addition, there is a burgeoning scholarship examining the
73. WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 88 (2011), available at
http://tinyurl.com/6st32nn (showing a precipitous drop in claims filed compared to the late 1990s).
74. William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L.
17, 24 (2005) (noting lower developed-country participation but finding that developing countries’
use “increased dramatically” from 2000–2005); Joseph Francois et al., Trading Profiles and Developing
Country Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System (Research Inst. Indus. Econ., Working Paper
No. 730, 2008), available at http://tinyurl.com/84y33jc (noting increased developing-country
participation over the last fifteen years while trying to determine objectively whether they are still
“underrepresented”).
75. See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719 (2003); Marc L. Busch et
al., Does Legal Capacity Matter? A Survey of WTO Members, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 559, (2009); Andrew
Guzman & Beth Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in WTO
Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 569 (2005); Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for
Developing Country Adaptation, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 177–98 (2006). See generally Chad Bown,
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incidence of wins and losses by developed and developing countries.
Scholars looking at WTO dispute outcomes have found that developing
countries win or lose just as regularly as do developed countries and have
concluded therefore that, once developing countries access the dispute
settlement system, there seems to be no bias against them.76 This
conclusion, however, underestimates how the difference in parties’
capabilities may determine their ability to advance their interests over time
beyond winning or losing in particular instances.
My analysis, in contrast, builds on the American socio-legal tradition,
analyzing dispute settlement as a system where participants often have
asymmetrical opportunities for gain. A seminal article in this tradition is
Marc Galanter’s classic “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead,”77 which
provides a socio-legal analysis of dispute-settlement in the U.S. legal
system, showing that the formal legal rules and the courts that apply them
are only part of the story. It is of great importance to understand who the
parties are, and what their different opportunities to gain are given their
characteristics.
This theoretical approach inverts the traditional analysis, which typically
starts at the rules, proceeds to look at how those rules are applied by the
respective institutions, and finally looks at their effects on parties. Instead,
this approach centers on the parties and their different characteristics,
analyzing how these differences affect the way the system works.78
According to this analysis, there are two ideal types of parties, situated in a
continuum: one shotters (OS) who only occasionally resort to court and
repeat players (RP) who are frequently engaged in similar disputes over an
extended period of time.79 Whether an actor is a one shotter or a repeat
player matters greatly for his incentives and his chances to benefit from
the legal system.
RPs have many advantages over OSs based on their greater party
capability.80 This capability is comprised of multiple elements but three
Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes, 27 WORLD ECON. 59
(2004); Francois et al., supra note 74; Peter Holmes et al., Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Back to the GATT? (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3133, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636553. See text accompanying infra notes 187–194.
76. See, e.g, Bernard Hoekman et al., Winners and Losers in the Panel Stage of the WTO Dispute
Settlement System, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 42, at 151,
161.
77. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). For a review of Galanter’s analysis twenty-five years later in various
legal domains, see Symposium, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. (1999).
See also IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert Kritzer & Susan
Silbey eds., 2003).
78. Galanter, supra note 77, at 97.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 99–103 (associating party capability with the RP-OS distinction to a greater extent than
with wealth and organization); Marc Galanter, Afterword: Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
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seem particularly relevant in the WTO context. First, RPs rely on
experience, expertise, and economies of scale they have built through
previous participation.81 Second, RPs can play the odds of litigation,
seeking to maximize gain over a series of cases, even at the risk of
incurring maximum loss in some cases.82 They play for rules too,
strategizing about rule-change over time, even if this means trading-off
tangible gain in a particular case. Finally, they are better able to influence
the impact of rules that favor them.83 Thus, although there is overlap with
wealth and level or organization, party capability, as honed in by repeat
participation, is an independent factor and a crucial one in determining
RPs success.84
Using this approach, it is possible to examine the parties’ different legal
capacity, their capacity to bargain given their alternatives, and their
knowledge of the judicial apparatus: judges, bailiffs, and the staff that they
interact with on a routine basis. Similarly, access to lawyers who know the
system well, the “invisible college of international trade lawyers,”85 matters
greatly.86 What is striking about Galanter’s analysis is his demonstration
that despite no bias in the rules or obvious favoritism by judges, the
institutional practices work to consistently favor the haves over the havenots.87
Galanter’s analysis does not have optimistic implications. But his
diagnosis can be useful in both understanding the incentives that maintain
the status quo, and finding where the opportunities for change may lie. A
number of scholars have begun using a sociological approach in the
347, 360–63 (1975).
81. Galanter, supra note 77, at 98–99.
82. Id. at 99.
83. Id. at 103.
84. Galanter, supra note 80, at 363.
85. I borrow this phrase from Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW.
U. L. REV. 217–26 (1977).
86. Galanter, supra note 77, at 114; Galanter, supra note 80, at 361–62.
87. Although the traditional discussion of RPs and OSs was not developed in the context of
international adjudications, this analysis is nevertheless relevant to understanding the WTO DSB as a
system. There are, of course, obvious differences. In the WTO, the parties are states and the
domestic processes through which a government decides to pursue litigation is typically more
complex than that of a firm. Similarly, state RPs are not actors specialized in a particular business
area, but instead deal with a wide range of subject matters. Finally, enforcement in the system is less
stringent than in a domestic setting. These differences, however, are not as stark as they may appear.
First, governments of RPs calculate the benefits of litigation with the interests of their domestic firms
and economic sector in mind and strategize accordingly. The experience and expertise they have
gained in past practice remain crucial, as do their ability to reduce costs through economies of scale.
Although the range of subject matters in which WTO RPs deal is relatively broad, all of the subjects
involve knowledge and expertise in international trade and the WTO Agreements. Lawyers gain
expertise in these subspecialties (subsidies, anti-dumping, intellectual property) just as traditional RPs
(insurers, banks, manufacturers) do in the different subspecialties of their business practice. Finally,
although the WTO’s enforcement mechanism is subject to the weaknesses that is characteristic of a
supra-national regime, it has been lauded for its effectiveness and its high rates of compliance.
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analysis of the international trade regime, which tends to show a
disadvantage in litigation for those countries that lack resources and do not
have the knowledge and experience to navigate the complex dispute
settlement process.88 The recommendations to target these disadvantages
range from building domestic legal capacity, to financial aid and technical
assistance, to expanding the WTO legal services department and setting up
a small claims court.89
Based on this valuable work, the analysis can be extended to account
for asymmetries in countries’ overall participation in WTO dispute
settlement that so far remain unexplored. First, there is RPs ability to
influence rule change in the long term.90 RPs are likely to play for rules in
88. In order of appearance in the literature, see, for example, Shaffer, supra note 75, at 177;
Gregory Shaffer, Three Developing Country Challenges in WTO Dispute Settlement: Some Strategies for
Adaptation, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 309
(Dencho Georgiev & Kim Van der Borght eds., 2006); Christina L. Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo,
Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication, 71 J. POLITICS 1033–49 (2009);
Joseph A. Conti, Learning to Dispute: Repeat Participation, Expertise, and Reputation at the World Trade
Organization, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 625 (2010); Joseph Conti, Producing Legitimacy at the World Trade
Organization: the Role of Expertise and Legal Capacity, 8 SOCIOECONOMIC REV. 131 (2010); Sungjoon
Cho, Beyond Rationality: A Sociological Construction of the World Trade Organization, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 321
(2012). But see Mary Kopczynski, The Haves Coming Out Behind: Galanter’s Theory Tested on the WTO
Dispute
Settlement
System
(2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/mary_kopczynski/1 (arguing that countries with lower incomes tend to
prevail more often). This analysis, however, equates repeat players with wealthy players, which loses
key aspects of the RP ideal type. Furthermore, the study counts a loss if the respondent lost only one
of multiple claims, regardless of the overall benefit or damage borne by the litigants. Moreover, it is a
static analysis, not accounting for the dynamic character of litigation where repeat players may lose in
specific instances but win the overall game. Finally, as the author admits, the “undergods” that come
out ahead in the analysis are clearly not made up of poor countries, which are still largely absent in
dispute settlement. The most important lesson of the analysis seems to be that complainants win
most of the time, regardless of relative wealth.
89. See, e.g., Brian T. Larson, Meaningful Technical Assistance in the WTO, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1163;
Gregory Shaffer & Hakan Nordstrom, Access to Justice in the World Trade Organization: The Case for a
Small Claims Procedure?, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 587–640 (2008).
90. Galanter, supra note 77, at 103. Conti argues that, in the WTO context, RPs stay on “safe
ground” and do not play for rule-change. Conti, Learning to Dispute, supra note 88, at 656–57. As I
hope it will become clear in the following section, the evidence seems to suggest that RPs do
strategize about rule development over time. But see Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO
Adjudication: From Empirical Analysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 383 (2009)
(arguing that rule formation is biased towards liberalization of trade as opposed to repeat players).
One potential limitation to the capacity of developing countries to intervene in defining this policy
space through litigation may be the WTO panels’ exercise of self-restraint. See, e.g., Marc L. Busch &
Krzysztof J. Pelc, The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization, 64 INT’L ORG. 257
(2010) (concluding that panels were more likely to exercise “judicial economy,” deciding the case on
narrow grounds when the United States or the European Union were parties to the dispute). Other
scholars are aware of the high stakes of the existing policy space in WTO rule interpretation but are
focused on reforms that would actually reduce the involvement of WTO adjudication in deciding
such cases. See, e.g., Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism,
53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 861 (2004) (arguing that although claims of judicial activism are exaggerated,
Panels and AB should avoid making decisions in cases of legal indeterminacy or when the decisions
could interfere with the powers of the political organs); Similarly, Krzysztof J. Pelc argues that the
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litigation and in political fora, and will spend resources in ensuring that
advantageous rules are enforced.91 RPs are often willing to trade off
tangible gain for rule gain. In other words, they would accept to lose a case
but win an important rule change that would benefit them in the future.
Similarly, a RP might decide to settle a case if it foresees that proceeding
with litigation might lead to an unfavorable rule change.92 Playing the odds
of litigation, however, also implies that in some cases a RP might win a
case, getting tangible gains in that particular instance, but lose a rule.
Second, the WTO dispute settlement features give rise to another
important dynamic that I call “adjusting to the rule.” When a RP’s
domestic measure has been found to be in breach of its WTO obligations,
it has considerable time and leeway to gradually adjust its measure to the
contours of the rule as defined by the WTO AB. In the process of
adjusting its measure the losing party may try not to overconform, testing
once again the boundaries of the rule. If the winning party is unsatisfied
and deems that the measure in question is still in breach, it may request an
implementation panel to decide the issue.93 The implementation panel’s
decision may then be appealed. The winning party may subsequently look
for compensation and, failing that, request authorization for retaliation in
the form of suspension of concessions.94 If the losing party objects to the
level of suspension of concessions, it can bring the matter to arbitration.95
As it is apparent, the losing party can thus test the boundaries of the rule
by slightly modifying its measure and making sure it does not do more
than is strictly needed. In addition, this structure also buys the losing party
time to deal with its own domestic process.
A third strategic possibility for a losing party is not to bring its measure
into compliance. In this case, it will have to compensate the winning party
or else accept retaliation. When a losing party deliberately decides to pay
for its violation, we are in the presence of efficient breach.96 In this
policy space available in the WTO regime might be necessary under some circumstances but as a
general matter, it repoliticizes issues that should remain juridified. Krzysztof J. Pelc, The Cost of
Wiggle Room: On the Use of Flexibility in International Trade Agreements (Aug. 7, 2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with Department of Government,
Georgetown University).
91. Galanter, supra note 77, at 100.
92. Id. at 101.
93. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 21.5, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
94. Id. art. 22.
95. Id. art 22.6.
96. While the text of the DSU unequivocally makes full compliance the prefered mode of
reparation over compensation or retaliation (DSU article 22.1), some scholars have argued that
incorporating the possibility of efficient breach is a virtue of the WTO system and is one that has
given WTO members considerable flexibility. See Judith Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L 416 (1996). Other scholars argue that describing the
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scenario the alternative to compliance is worth more to the losing party
than compliance itself. Thus, it decides to pay the costs of noncompliance, which would presumably be outweighed by the benefits it
derived from the breach.
In all these instances, RPs can exploit the procedural vulnerabilities of
the WTO system to “drag their feet” and gain time without having to pay
for it. In addition, the dispute settlement rules only afford prospective
relief to the winning party. Thus, compensation is due only from the time
of expiry of the reasonable period of time for implementation and not
from the time the measure was enacted. Similarly, each party is responsible
for its own litigation fees, requiring the losing party to cover only its own
costs. These rules create incentives for RPs to resort to litigation and
protract it in order to gain time to maintain their domestic measures.
The party behavior I have described in the cases of rule change or
adjustment to the rule ought not to be equated with efficient breach. These
two options are ways to defend a valuable domestic measure while trying
to bring it into compliance with WTO obligations. To be sure, when a
respondent values its domestic measure highly it will try to “win” the case
before considering paying for non-compliance. But the point is that RPs
can “win” in multiple ways beyond obtaining favorable relief in a particular
case. They can win by obtaining a rule change even when losing tangible
benefits in the case at bar. They can win by “adjusting to the rule” in a
gradual manner without conforming. And they can win by exploiting the
procedural vulnerabilities of the system, gaining time to phase out the
breaching measure while providing a protective cushion to their domestic
sectors.
Furthermore, it should be noted that a feature of WTO litigation is that
an increasing number of disputes are held between RPs. A number of
developing countries have become active participants in the system and
they are litigating not only against developed countries, which are RPs, but
WTO in this way does a disservice to the binding character of international obligations and to the
emphasis on restitution (or withdrawal of the violating measure) as the primary means of compliance.
See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal
Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L 60 (1997); see also Judith H. Bello, Book Review, 95 AJIL 984 (2001)
(reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO, and agreeing with
Jackson that WTO obligations are legally binding and that a country’s choice of efficient breach does
not satisfy its legal obligation. However, Bello praises the WTO for “its realistic recognition that it
cannot enforce specific compliance” and incorporates second-best mechanisms that can restore the
balance of rights and obligations. For a more elaborate analysis on the character of WTO obligations
see the following competing positions represented by Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 179-204 (2002) and John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:
Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109-125 (2004). Irrespective of one’s
normative position in this debate, it seems to be the case that WTO members resort to this
alternative and that the WTO has the institutional and procedural infrastructure to sustain it.).
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also against other active developing countries. In this scenario of RPs v.
RPs, “we might expect that there would be heavy expenditure on ruledevelopment, many appeals, and rapid and elaborate development of the
doctrinal law.”97 These conditions heighten the importance of active
participation in dispute settlement and may explain why so many countries
are participating as third parties, taking a position on issues that concern
them in order to influence rule change.

2.

In Practice

The strategies by RPs designed to advance their interests through rule
change or adjustment to the rule are evident in several famous cases. For
example, the United States was able to advance domestic environmental
policies that at first seemed prohibited by the main GATT obligations and
not covered by the exceptions. The United States was successful at
expanding the scope of Article XX of GATT98 so that it could ban the
importation of products originating from countries that did not adopt its
environmental standards. This is a story of a RP seeking to change a rule
through lawyering and litigation while gradually adjusting its measures to
fit the new rule interpretation. Although the United States lost every one
of its cases, the transformation of the rule, from prohibition to permission,
has been quite dramatic and it is ultimately a story of a country’s success in
advancing its domestic policies within the WTO framework.
The process of rule change and adjustment to the rule began with the
Tuna-Dolphin cases. In Tuna-Dolphin I,99 Mexico challenged the United
States’s Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), which placed
an import ban on tuna and tuna products caught using fishing methods
that were not comparable to U.S. standards.100 The panel declared the ban
to be in breach of GATT Article XI and to be outside the scope of the
exceptions in Article XX, due to its extraterritorial reach. It interpreted
97. Galanter, supra note 77, at 112–13.
98. GATT, supra note 51, art. XX. Article XX, which was the central rule at stake in all these
cases, consists of a general exception to the non-discrimination principles of the main GATT. Of
particular importance in this story were paragraph (g) of Article XX, and the preamble, also known as
the chapeau. The Article reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures . . . (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption.
Id.
99. Panel Report, United States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (circulated Sept. 3,
1991),30 I.L.M. 1598 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I].
100. Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.7.
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Article XX(g) as justifying measures that affected only production and
consumption in the jurisdiction of the country enacting the measure.101 It
reasoned that a country could not impose import restrictions on a product
merely because it originated in a country with different environmental
regulations.102 To accept the extra-territorial interpretation of Article XX
proposed by the United States, the Panel declared, would jeopardize the
rights of contracting parties under GATT, subjecting those rights to
unilateral determination by each country.103 In addition, as a condition of
entry, the measure established a moving target, subjecting exporters to the
yearly U.S. incidental dolphin-taking rate, which exporters could not
predict. As a result, the Panel established that the measure could not be
“primarily aimed at” conservation, and thus it did not “relate to” the
conservation of natural resources as required by Article XX(g).104
In its conclusion, the Panel noted that if the GATT Contracting Parties
wanted to permit this type of trade restrictive measure, “it would be
preferable to do so not by interpreting Article XX, but by amending or
supplementing the provisions of the General Agreement or waiving
obligations thereunder.”105 This statement illustrates the Panel’s view, and
that of many Contracting Parties participating in the case as third parties,
that the text of the Agreement as it stood did not allow for this kind of
unilateral measures. The Panel thought that they so threatened the rights
of parties in the Agreement and the multilateral framework that if the
Contracting Parties wanted to allow this type of unilateral measures, it
would be best for them to change the rules directly through the
“legislative” process. What in fact has happened, however, is exactly the
opposite story.
This type of measures became acceptable precisely through rule
interpretation by panels and the AB in litigation. The change took place
over the course of several cases, in which RPs, primarily the United States,
advanced interpretations of GATT Article XX(g) that were favorable to
their own domestic policy interests.106 The trajectory of change has not
101. Id. ¶¶ 5.30–5.34. In addition, the Panel found the U.S. secondary embargo of tuna and tuna
products from “intermediary nations” also violated GATT Article XI and was not justifiable under
Article XX. Id. ¶¶ 5.35–5.37.
102. Id. ¶ 6.2.
103. Id. ¶ 5.32.
104. Id. ¶5.33.
105. Id. ¶ 6.3.
106. For example, the United States argued and eventually won acceptance for the extraterritorial
application of domestic environmental regulations over bycatch of fishing operations in the global
commons. See id. ¶ 5.32 (rejecting the extraterritorial application of environmental policies out of
hand); Panel Report, United States — Restrictions on the Import of Tuna, ¶ 5.24, DS29/R (circulated June
16, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II] (holding the embargo was not “related
to” conservation because it required coercion against other states); Appellate Body Report, United
States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 19, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996)
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been swift nor a perfect linear progression from case to case. It has
required the insistent and strategic advancement of favorable doctrinal
interpretations and the challenge of unfavorable ones. RP, as the most
active players in litigation, have had the greater opportunity to influence
rule changes.
In Tuna-Dolphin II,107 a panel analyzed a U.S. primary and intermediary
embargo designed to protect dolphins in non-territorial waters that was
challenged by the European Economic Community.108 The Panel once
again found the embargo to be in breach of GATT Article III and XI, but,
in an important departure from Tuna-Dolphin I, it declared that protecting
dolphins in non-territorial waters was an acceptable policy encompassed
by the Article XX exceptions.109 The problem in this case, however, was
that the means to achieve the policy goals were inappropriate.110 In
interpreting the language of XX(g), the Panel placed particular importance
on the words “relating to” and took them to mean “primarily aimed at,”
holding that both the purpose and the effects of the measure had to be
primarily aimed at conservation.111 The Panel concluded that the U.S.
embargoes were in place only to force other nations to comply with U.S.
conservation policy.112 The Panel then reframed the question as to whether
measures intended to force other countries to regulate persons in their
jurisdiction could relate to preservation. It found that in order to preserve
the spirit of the agreement113 Article XX exceptions should not be
interpreted broadly; therefore measures enacted to force other countries to
take domestic action do not “relate to” conservation.114 Although the
United States lost again, in this second case the rule became more
capacious. After Tuna-Dolphin II, in principle, a conservation policy with
extra-territorial effects could fall within the scope of the exceptions in
Article XX.115
(holding that the “related to” analysis should focus on the purposes of the measure and not the
differential treatment between nations); Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 122,
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22 2001) (holding that unilateral measures penalizing other nations do not
violate the chapeau of Article XX if the imposing nation has made a good faith effort to negotiate
multilaterally).
107. Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 106.
108. Id. ¶ 1.1.
109. Id. ¶ 5.20.
110. Id. ¶ 5.42.
111. Id. ¶ 5.22.
112. Id. ¶ 5.24.
113. Id. ¶ 5.26.
114. Id. ¶ 5.27. The Panel concluded that measures taken so as to force other countries to change
their policies, and that were effective only if such changes occurred, could not be primarily aimed
either at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, or at rendering effective restrictions on
domestic production or consumption, in the meaning of Article XX (g). Id.
115. It should be noted that both Tuna-Dolphin panel reports were eventually not adopted.
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Just days after the WTO was established, another important case arose
and the United States continued to push for expansion of the exception
under GATT Art. XX(g).116 The Reformulated Gasoline117 case involved a
U.S. measure that required imported gasoline to meet a special statutory
baseline (inapplicable to domestic gasoline) with regards to certain
chemical characteristics.118 The Panel declared that the U.S. measure was
discriminatory and violated the national treatment rule of Article III:4.
Moreover, the measure did not fall within the scope of the exception in
Article XX(g). The panel held that the less favorable baseline
establishment rules were not “primarily aimed at” the conservation of
natural resources.119
On appeal, however, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) made an
important change to the analysis of Article XX(g) and held that the
contested measure did fall within its scope.120 In an important
development, the AB changed the interpretation of the phrase “relating
to” in Article XX(g) and separated the analysis of the measure’s purpose
from the measure’s effects. It refused to consider the measure’s
unfavorable treatment (the effects of the measure) in the analysis of
whether the measure “relates to” the conservation of natural resources.121
The AB considered that discriminatory treatment is already implicit in the
invocation of an exception and it should not prejudge whether the
measure relates or not to the conservation of natural resources.122 Instead,
the AB examined whether the measure itself was related to the
conservation of clean air in the United States and found in the affirmative,
stating that it could not be regarded as “merely incidentally or
inadvertently” aimed at such conservation goal.123
116. Subject to the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism, this and subsequent disputes would
go through a Panel and also through the newly established Appellate Body procedure.
117. Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter AB Reformulated Gasoline]; Panel Report, United States —
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, (January 29, 1996).
118. AB Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 117, at 2 (identifying the measure in dispute as the
Gasoline Rule, a 1994 regulation that the Environmental Protection Agency enacted pursuant to the
Clean Air Act of 1990).
119. Id. at 14.
120. Id. at 14–19.
121. The Appellate Body declared that one problem with the Panel’s reasoning is that “the Panel
asked itself whether the ‘less favorable treatment’ of imported gasoline was ‘primarily aimed at’ the
conservation of natural resources, rather than whether the ‘measure’, i.e. the baseline establishment
rules, were ‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of clean air. In our view, the Panel here was in error
in referring to its legal conclusion on Article III:4 instead of the measure in issue.” Id. at 16.
122. “The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on its head. Obviously, there had to be a
finding that the measure provided ‘less favourable treatment’ under Article III:4 before the Panel
examined the ‘General Exceptions’ contained in Article XX. That, however, is a conclusion of law.
The Chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the ‘measures’ which are to be examined under
Article XX (g), and not the legal finding of ‘less favourable treatment.’” Id.
123. Id. at 19.
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The AB moved the analysis of the measure’s effects to the chapeau of
Article XX. It set an analytical structure by which first it has to be
determined whether the measure fits within one of Article XX exceptions
and then whether the application of the measure complies with the
requirements of the chapeau. The AB concluded, however, that the U.S.
measure did not meet the requirements. So, once again, the United States
lost the case on appeal but it achieved an important rule change.124
In Shrimp-Turtle I,125 at issue was a U.S. statute imposing a ban on the
importation of shrimp and certain shrimp products harvested with fishing
technology that resulted in the incidental killing of sea turtles and that was
not comparable to fishing technology used within the United States.126 The
Panel concluded that the measures violated Article XI and were not
covered by Article XX.127 Reversing the order of analysis set out in
Gasoline, the Panel considered first whether the measure fell within the
scope of Article XX by analyzing whether it satisfied the conditions of the
chapeau. The Panel declared that the U.S. measure fell outside the scope
of Article XX because it went against the objects and purposes of the
WTO.128 Echoing the reasoning in Tuna-Dolphin I and explicitly referring
to Tuna-Dolphin II, the Panel determined that a country’s unilateral
measure, conditioning market access upon the adoption of its own
domestic standards, would damage the security and predictability of trade
124. “Although the United States ultimately lost its appeal, it expressed great satisfaction with the Appellate
Body’s analysis of Article XX(g). Past GATT panels had focused, as had the Gasoline panel, on whether
the GATT-inconsistent aspect of a measure was ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation. The AB’s decision
that it was necessary to look at the broader measure — the baseline establishment rules generally —
and examine whether they were aimed at conservation significantly expanded the scope of Article
XX(g).” JACKSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 611 (emphasis added).
125. The dispute concerning the U.S. measures in Shrimp-Turtle would go through all the steps of
the WTO dispute settlement system and be litigated several times, first in a Panel, Panel Report,
United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998)
[hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I], then in the Appellate Body, Appellate Body Report, United States —
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle II], and finally in an implementation procedure that included a Panel and AB decisions,
Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle
III]. For purposes of illustrating the changes in rule interpretation and in adjustment to the rule I call
these cases Shrimp-Turtle I, II, and III respectively, even though they consist of different phases of the
same dispute.
126. The U.S. measure challenged by Malaysia is listed as a supplement to 16 U.S.C.A. § 1537(b) (
(West 2008) (referred to as § 609). Congress passed the measure in Section 609 of Public Law 101162, which was a 1989 appropriations bill. Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103
Stat. 988, 1037 (1989). Countries could be exempted from the ban if they certified that 1) there was
no risk to sea turtles from the fishing environment in which shrimp was harvested (aqua-farms or
“artisanal methods”) or 2) the country adopted regulatory measures comparable to the United States.
The ban was initially limited geographically to the wider Caribbean/western Atlantic region but was
later extended to all countries.
127. Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 125, at ¶¶ 7.12, 7.27.
128. Id. ¶ 7.49.
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relations and threaten the whole multilateral system.129 The Panel also
declared that the U.S. measure was overinclusive, as it did not take into
account different local and regional conditions. It concluded that the
United States could better achieve its conservation goals through
multilateral negotiation of international agreements and not unilateral
conditions.130
The United States challenged the Panel decision on all fronts and
achieved important changes in the interpretation of Article XX in ShrimpTurtle II.131 Following Reformulated Gasoline, the AB reversed again the
method of analysis of Article XX and examined first whether the measure
fell within one of the enumerated clauses of Article XX and second
whether the measure complied with the requirements of the chapeau.132
The AB decided that the measure “relat[ed] to conservation.”133 This time,
the AB did not use the term “primarily aimed at” and it declared that the
measure was proportionate in reach and scope to the goal of conservation
of sea turtles: “the means are, in principle, reasonably related to the
ends.”134 Ultimately, the United States lost the case on appeal because it
was found to violate the chapeau of Art. XX,135 but it obtained several
important wins concerning the criteria for assessing whether a measure of
this kind was permissible.
Following Shrimp-Turtle II, the United States revised its measure and
adopted the 1999 Guidelines, which modified the conditions under which
Section 609 applied.136 It also made efforts to negotiate a new Agreement
129. Id. ¶¶ 7.46, 7.51.
130. Id. ¶ 7.55.
131. Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 125.
132. Id. ¶ 118. According to the AB, that order had a clear logic and the Panel was wrong to have
inverted it. Id. ¶ 119.
133. Id. ¶ 135-36
134. Id. ¶ 141.
135. The AB decided that the language of the chapeau in Article XX had to be interpreted in light
of the object and purpose of that Article and not of GATT or the WTO Agreement, since the nature
of the exception implied the breach of a substantive obligation. The purpose of Article XX was thus
to prevent abuse or misuse of the exception and the analysis of the chapeau involved the application of
the measure, not its design. The AB then proceeded to apply the elements of the chapeau, namely
whether there was discrimination and whether such discrimination was arbitrary or unjustifiable
“between countries where the same conditions prevail.” The AB found that the U.S. ban was
unjustifiable because it required other WTO members to adopt “essentially the same” regulatory
standards that existed in the United States to achieve a policy goal, without considering different
conditions in other Members’ territories. Id. ¶¶ 164–65. The AB also found it to be unjustifiable that
the United States had engaged some members but not others in negotiations to conclude
international agreements for the protection of sea turtles before imposing its import ban. Id. ¶ 166.
The AB found that the U.S. measure was also arbitrary, given its rigidity and inflexibility. Id. ¶ 177.
Moreover, it found that the certification process lacked a review process and that important due
process requirements were missing. Id. ¶ 180.
136. Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating
to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,949 (July 8,
1999). The United States also engaged in negotiations with shrimp producing nations in Southeast
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with countries of the Indian Ocean and the Southeast Asia region.137 In
Shrimp-Turtle III,138 Malaysia challenged in a compliance panel these U.S.
rule adjustments as an insufficient implementation of the AB Shrimp-Turtle
II ruling.139 Malaysia argued that, to avoid arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination under the chapeau, the United States needed to conclude an
international agreement for the protection of sea turtles.140 The Panel and
the AB disagreed and found that serious, good faith efforts to negotiate an
international agreement on the part of the United States were sufficient to
comply with the chapeau.141 Malaysia also argued that, even if Section 609
now allowed certification of countries that have “comparable” regulatory
programs to the United States and not “essentially the same,” it would still
constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.142 The reason,
Malaysia argued, was that the measure “conditions access to the United
States market on compliance with policies and standards ‘unilaterally’
prescribed by the United States.”143 The AB disagreed with Malaysia and
found that, due to the new flexibilities introduced in Section 609 and the
new procedures in the certification process, the measure was now in
compliance with the chapeau requirements and therefore valid under
XX(g).144
It should be noted that, in adjusting its measure to the new rule
interpretation in Shrimp-Turtle II, the United States carefully tested the
boundaries of the rule and managed to obtain a favorable ruling. The
United States initiated negotiations, but did not conclude any new
multilateral agreement with the winning countries.145 This ended up being
a wise course of action for the United States, since, in Shrimp-Turtle III, the
AB found that a good-faith effort to negotiate was enough.146
In counting the general wins and losses of the United States in these
environmental cases the tally is not favorable to the United States, which
lost all the cases analyzed above except for the very last one. The United
States lost in the sense that the measure in question was found to violate
WTO obligations. The United States, however, has been successful in
transforming and expanding the scope of Article XX(g), so that it is no
Asia pursuant to the Appellate Body decision in Shrimp-Turtle II. See Shrimp-Turtle III, supra note 125,
at ¶ 131.
137. Shrimp-Turtle III, supra note 125, at ¶ 115.
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶ 1.
140. Id. ¶ 115.
141. Id. ¶ 122.
142. Id. ¶ 145.
143. Id. ¶ 136.
144. Id. ¶¶ 153–54.
145. In fact, the United States negotiated these agreements while the previous measures were still
in effect.
146. Shrimp-Turtle III, supra note 125, at ¶¶ 122–23.
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longer interpreted to prohibit conditioning market access to other
members upon the adoption of comparable environmental standards of
those of the United States. In fact, the rule progressed from outright
prohibition of this trade restriction (only fixable through amendment to
the Agreement, as the Panel in Tuna-Dolphin recommended) to favorable
permission. In this way, the United States expanded its policy space
through strategic wins in rule interpretation and adjustments to the rule.147
As can be seen in these environmental cases148, there is a progression by
which an RP can achieve an important transformation of a rule or set of
rules to accommodate its interests.149 The emphasis of the analysis here is
on the parties and on how they manage to weave their policy interests
within the confines of the WTO by expanding the boundaries of the rules.
The United States did not get discouraged by what looked like a restriction
in the Agreement or by unfavorable interpretations by Panels or the AB.
Instead, the United States enacted measures that it deemed important to its
domestic objectives and then sought to defend them when challenged. It
carefully adjusted its measures to test the limits of new rule interpretations
and defended its adjustment whenever it was challenged. Along the way,
the United States also took advantage of the procedural vulnerabilities of

147. This does not mean to suggest that these changes were the sole responsibility of the U.S.
government. There was, of course, enormous pressure from U.S. and international environmental
groups who advocated for the domestic measure in question. For an analysis of U.S. compliance with
the Shrimp-Turtle decision, see generally Renata Benedini, Complying with the WTO Shrimp Turtle Decision,
in RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 419 (Edith Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson eds.,
2008).
148. For further analysis of these cases, see Steve Charnovitz, The WTO’s Environmental Progress,
10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 685 (2007); Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case:
A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491(2002).
149. In his important article about WTO litigation, Conti asserts that RPs do not strategize to
secure rule-changes in ambiguous or untested areas of WTO law. Conti, Learning to Dispute, supra note
88, at 656. This assertion, however, relies partly on a distinction between clarifying an obligation and
creating a new rule that seems hard to sustain. Id. When an adjudicator clarifies the meaning of an
ambiguous rule, she is, in effect, creating a new rule that chooses a particular interpretation over
other competing alternatives. Parties in litigation do not expect adjudicators to create new rules from
a clean slate. Rather, they propose interpretations that would give the rule a new meaning, thus
creating a new rule to favor their interests. Conti states that “[t]here is little evidence that repeat
litigants strategize the development of WTO law over a series of disputes.” Id. at 657. Further, he
claims that because RPs can anticipate the impact of a potential rule change, they tend to carefully
avoid clarification of obligations. He concludes that “this is a reverse playing-for-the-rules strategy
based on the avoidance of uncertainty and negative implications of the clarification of obligations.”
Id. But if RPs are likely to anticipate the impact of a rule, there is no reason they should abstain from
strategic litigation if the odds favor them. And it is precisely RPs who are best situated to avoid
uncertainty by continuing to push for particular interpretations overtime. Conti recognizes that third
parties may join a dispute “for the opportunity to affect the interpretation of an obligation.” Id. This
behavior, however, may very well be seen as complementary, rather than exceptional, to RPs’ strategy
as litigants. Legal analysis of rule development, like the saga of environmental cases analyzed above,
shows that RPs invest in rule-change over time through strategic litigation.
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the system, by delaying the measure adjustment as much as the procedural
mechanism allowed.
Developing countries are learning to use WTO rules and exceptions to
their advantage, arguing that their domestic measures fall under accepted
justifications, like protecting the environment, health, and public morals.
But they are also learning that claiming an exception is not a trump card
because there is an elaborate and evolving doctrine, largely influenced by
RPs, as to the applicability of each exception. Thus, governments have to
learn how to craft their measures in a way that would pass muster under
the WTO. For that, they need institutional legal capacity, so they can shape
a measure in a manner that would make it WTO-consistent and can
defend it through effective lawyering and litigation.150

B.

Rule-Based and Doctrinal Space for Countries’ Policy Preferences

In this Section, I describe areas of policy autonomy that countries have
begun to carve out by proposing novel or non-obvious interpretations of
the agreements’ text in the areas of the environment, labor, and intellectual
property.151

1.

Environmental Regulations

As I have shown, the exception in GATT Article XX(g), as now
interpreted by the AB, may enable a country to enact unilateral
environmental measures with which exporting countries have to comply in
order to gain market access, regardless of whether those measures pertain
solely to the environment within these exporting countries.152 Countries
have thus gained considerable environmental policy autonomy. As a result,
a WTO member can erect trade barriers against exporting countries that
do not comply with its environmental regulatory standards.153
150. This might be especially important if DSB itself, according to one argument, has started to
develop a bias of interpretation against countries’ claims of regulatory autonomy. See Colares, supra
note 90, at 387–88. For an opposite view, see Michael Ming Du, supra note 71.
151. For an excellent analysis of the tension between the values of liberal trade and
environmental advocates, see generally Edith B. Weiss & John H. Jackson, The Framework for The
Environment and Trade, in RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE, supra note 147, at, 1; see also
Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith
Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2000) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the main
international environmental commitments, the mechanisms to ensure their compliance and the
challenges to make them effective).
152. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 51–52 (2009).
153. For a detailed discussion of potential areas of interaction between environmental protection
and WTO rules, see Bradly J. Condon, Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law, 12 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 895 (2009).
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Countries could potentially use this expansion of Article XX(g) for the
purposes of promoting domestic climate change regulation. Of course,
pursuant to the AB’s past interpretations, any protective measure still
needs to comply with Article XX’s chapeau. In fact, the language of the
now defunct Boxer Amendment to the Lieberman-Warner Climate
Security Act of 2008 in the United States might violate the requirements of
the chapeau.154 Nonetheless, one could imagine climate change legislation
that would be more carefully designed to pass muster under WTO by
making sure that the provisions of the measure treat similarly situated
countries equally.

2.

Labor Standards

Potential space for national policy autonomy also exists in labor
standards. For example, a country might be able to enact trade-restrictive
measures to ensure compliance with internationally-recognized labor
standards.155 There are plausible interpretations of the non-discrimination
principle, found in the most favored nation156 and national treatment157
rules, which might justify trade restrictions on goods produced under
working conditions that violate fundamental labor rights.
Ultimately, even if the trade measure is considered to be in breach of
WTO nondiscriminatory obligations, a state might successfully invoke the
public morals exception in GATT Article XX(a) to justify trade sanctions
for violations of core labor standards as human rights.158 The AB first had
the occasion to rule on the public morals exception in Article XIV (a) of
the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS),159 which has similar
text to the public morals exception in GATT. The Panel defined public
morals as the “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on
154. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 152, at 83–87. The authors conclude that although the Act’s
“provisions on imports seem to have been written with a roadmap of WTO law in mind . . . there
remain GATT violations that would require defense under Article XX, and an adjudication would
probably find that the program fails to comply with the chapeau of Article XX. Id. at 88.
155. Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 148–49 (1999); See ROBERT HOWSE & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 571–74 (2005);
156. See HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 571 (arguing that under criteria established by
the AB in Canada-Autos an origin-neutral condition based on compliance with core labor standards in
the product’s process of production might be consistent with Article I:1 even in regard of like
products).
157. Id. at 572 (arguing that based on the “consumer tastes and habits” criteria set out by the AB
in Asbestos, interpreting Article III:4, a state may validly target imported products whose production
violates core labor standards for considering them unlike similar domestic products whose production
complies with such standards).
158. Howse, supra note 155, at 142–45; HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 572–73.
159. Panel Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
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behalf of a community or nation.”160 The AB concurred with the Panel’s
decision, thus giving countries considerable latitude to define the scope of
its public morals and determine the practices that violate them.161 More
recently, the AB decided its first case on XX(a), confirming this
interpretation.162
But an exception on public morals is not a blank check.163 A state
enacting such a measure would still need to comply with the requirements
of the chapeau in Article XX, as interpreted by the AB in the Shrimp-Turtle
case. In addition, a WTO member would need to show that a measure is
“necessary” for the protection of public morals.164
One example of a country’s trade-restrictive measure based on
violations of labor standards is the current U.S. ban on all trade with
Burma under the 2003 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act.165 The Act
was issued subsequent to an International Labour Organization (ILO)
inquiry into labor rights abuses and an ensuing ILO recommendation to
which the Burmese military junta failed to respond. Were the Act to be
challenged in the WTO, it could be upheld as an exception because it
clearly complies with the requirements under Article XX(a).166 In this case,
there was a definitive multilateral judgment against the violation of labor
rights in Burma. Indeed, for the first time, the ILO invoked Article 33 of
its Constitution, which allows other ILO members to take measures
against a member to secure compliance.167
160. Id. ¶¶ 6.4–6.6.
161. See id. ¶ 3.5; Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 146, at ¶ 296. Robert Howse and Michael Trebilcock argue that
“based on the panel’s deferential reasoning as to the content of public morals, there is no reason why
[its content] could not extend to beliefs of the importing country concerning the wrongfulness of
consuming products produced in a context — either corporate or national — where basic labour
rights are not respected.” HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 572–73.
162. Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009).
163. See Mark Wu, Note, Free Trade and the Protection of Public Morals: An Analysis of the Newly
Emerging Public Morals Clause Doctrine, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 215 (2008).
164. This would involve an analysis of whether there is any “reasonably available less traderestrictive alternative” or whether the measure has a “close relationship to the given objective.”
HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 573–74. For the most recent Appellate Body analysis of
necessity concerning public morals, see Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Affecting Trading
Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, supra note 162,
at ¶¶ 234–337 (confirming that “at least one of the alternative measures proposed by the United
States is an alternative ‘reasonably available’ to China” and declaring that China had “not
demonstrated that the relevant provisions are ‘necessary’ to protect public morals”). Id. ¶¶ 336–37.
165. Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §1701 (2003).
166. Howse and Trebilcock note that “a group of WTO scholars from leading U.S. law schools
issued a joint statement through the Free Burma Coalition, explaining how, in the case of Burma,
sanctions could be defended under Article XX of the GATT, especially given the actions already
taken by the ILO [International Labour Organization].” HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at
568.
167. Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., International Labour Conference Adopts Resolution
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Intellectual Property

TRIPS is perhaps the WTO agreement that has received the harshest
criticism for its stringent standards on patents, trademarks and copyrights.
Some development scholars have argued that the TRIPS agreement
represents the clearest case of rich states wanting to subject developing
countries to their own standards and have called for its repudiation.168
Criticism of TRIPS has been particularly harsh when it comes to
protection of pharmaceutical patents because of the obstacles it imposes
on access to medicines in poor countries.169
Despite the stringent protections established under TRIPS, legal
scholars have pointed out flexibilities in the domestic application of the
TRIPS agreement, particularly when it comes to enabling access to
medicines to further their health policies.170 For example, states can
mandate compulsory licensing for certain drugs, which effectively
supersedes any patent exclusivity in exchange for a royalty.171 Under
TRIPS Article 31, WTO members can grant a compulsory license as long
as it is conditioned upon “reasonable compensation to the rights-holder
and provided the license applies only to the market of the granting WTO

Targeting Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma) (June 14, 2000), available at
http://tinyurl.com/75tsaqj.
168. See RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 149; Birdsall et al., supra
note 14, at 144.
169. James Love, From TRIPs to RIPs: A Better Trade Framework to Support Innovation in Medical
Technologies, Paper for the Workshop on Economic Issues Related to Access to HIV/AIDS Care in
Developing Countries, Agence nationale de recherches sur le sida/Institute d' économie publique (Université de la
Méditerranée), Marseille, France (May 27, 2003), available at www.cptech.org/slides/trips2rips.doc.
170. See, e.g., Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential Treatment
in WTO Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1
(2005).
171. See Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at ¶ 4.The Declaration responded to the perceived
danger that the TRIPS agreement would overly restrict counries’ ability to deal with public health
emergencies. For an early assessment of both the restrictiveness and the flexibility of TRIPS, see
Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global
Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 25 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1069 (1996). For a thorough account of the interpretive issues that have arisen
in the domain of TRIPS flexibilities, see Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J.
874–86 (2007). In 2009 report to the General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to
physical and mental health noted that “pressure from developed countries has played a prominent
role in shaping the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities in developing countries and
L[east]D[eveloped]C[ountrie]s”. Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Promotion and Protection of all Human
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 26, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/11/12 (Mar. 31, 2009) (by Anand Grover). The Special Rapporteur ends the report
with a recommendation that “developing countries and LDCs should seek international assistance in
building capacity to implement TRIPS flexibilities” and that they should avoid enacting free trade
agreements or bilateral trade agreements that include more restrictive provisions (“TRIPS- plus”). Id.
¶¶ 106, 108.
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member.”172 But the dominant interpretation of the Article, which has
been effectively advanced by the pharmaceutical industry with the support
of developed countries’ governments, makes it more difficult for
developing countries to use compulsory licensing, even to address a health
crisis.173 Unfortunately, the TRIPs division of the WTO Secretariat seems
to have enabled and supported this interpretation by emphasizing the
strictness of TRIPs restrictions and “underemphasizing the flexibilities” of
the regime.174
Furthermore, on the question of whether poor countries without
manufacturing capacity could import generic drugs, there is a plausible
interpretation that they could do so under Article 30 exception. Although
Article 31 limits the granting of such a license to the domestic market of
the WTO member in question,
[T]here are good reasons to think that the granting of a compulsory
license could be extended to the market in another WTO member
country as an Article 30 exception, where that other WTO member
indicates that were it to possess its own manufacturing capacity, it
would itself have granted such a license for production of generics
domestically.175
This exception is consistent with the normal exploitation of the patent and
does not undermine the patent holders’ legitimate interests.176 The point is
that the problem “could be solved within the four corners of TRIPs.”177
Thus, the key question is not the rigidity of the text but the interpretations
promoted by powerful industrial groups and developed countries that
promote a closure not warranted by the text of the agreement.178
Beyond compulsory licensing, scholars have noted further flexibilities in
the implementation of the TRIPS agreement. States can exercise discretion
in several areas, such as by limiting the patentable subject matter, setting a
high inventive step standard, expanding procedural opportunities to
challenge patents before and after they are granted, and imposing
172. HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 429.
173. Id. Reflecting on the South African controversy, Howse and Trebilcock conclude that
“neither the parallel importation foreseen by the South African legislation nor the alternative of
compulsory licensing itself is prohibited under TRIPs — the problem was not the Agreement but it
being interpreted unreasonably, in a manner that allowed it to be used to bully developing countries
with an HIV/AIDS crisis.” Id. at 429–30.
174. Id. at 429
175. Id. at 430.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 431.
178. Howse and Trebilcock conclude that “it is important that the conduct of the WTO
Secretariat in endorsing these kinds of interpretations be carefully reviewed, especially what it tells
developing-country governments about the meaning of TRIPs in the context of technical assistance
and training programs” Id. at 431-32.
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limitations on injunctive remedies.179 While TRIPS contains many brightline obligations, such as a minimum twenty-year duration requirement for
patents, it also includes many vague standards, such as the “requirement to
engage in ‘reasonable’ efforts to negotiate with patent holders before
overriding a patent”.180 Developing countries have a real opportunity to
interpret these terms in their favor during the implementation and
administration of their domestic regulation, in compliance with TRIPS.181
Some developing countries have already begun to do so. 182 In reaction to
this trend and providing further evidence of the existing flexibilities in
TRIPS, developed countries such as the United States have tried to
negotiate stricter terms in bilateral trade agreements.183
As we have seen, even in TRIPS, RPs in the WTO can exploit available
legal interpretations to their advantage. One important lesson that emerges
from this discussion is that often the biggest impediments to national
policy autonomy lie not on the Agreements themselves, but in dominant
interpretations of them.184 RPs are able to promote favorable
interpretations in litigation but also through other means. For instance,
they can promote advantageous interpretations through technical
assistance programs.185 A key question is thus what the obstacles that
developing countries confront in taking advantage of the WTO
179. Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in
India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1589 (2009).
180. Id. at 1588.
181. See id. at 1589 (“In the process of interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, and in part through
the intervention of local industry and health advocates, India introduced robust versions of familiar
flexibilities such as compulsory licensing, but also introduced some less common and even entirely
new flexibilities.”).
182. For an overview of the ways in which developing countries have already tried to take
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities, see ELLEN F.M. ’T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER 61 (2009).
183. Id. at 69–72. For a thorough account of U.S. efforts to conclude bilateral treaties in the area
of intellectual property and an analysis of the potentially negative effects on developing countries, see
Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, J. WORLD INT’L PROP. 791 (2005). The
provisions sought through bilateral treaties are known as ‘TRIPS-plus,’ and they explicitly go beyond
what is required by TRIPS. See Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on
Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399 (2006).
184. This legal-institutional analysis can be taken further to discuss the question of whether the
WTO should deal with other pressing global issues, like migration, which are usually thought to lie
outside the scope of the Organization. In an illuminating analysis, Joel Trachtman examines the
ambivalent relationship between GATS Mode 4, regulating trade in services provided by natural
persons from another country, with a host state’s immigration law. JOEL TRACHTMAN, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION: TOWARD THE FOURTH FREEDOM 241–46
(2009). Trachtman suggests that nothing would bar states from making “cross-concessions” or
liberalizations in goods for liberalization in migration. Id. at 333.
185. Kapczynski notes that developing countries face important limitations in exploiting these
flexibilities, such as lack of resources, a dominant transnational legal culture that fills in the gaps of
TRIPS ambiguities with interpretations that favor high-protection jurisdictions, and extra-legal
pressure. Kapczynski, supra note 179, at 1631.
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agreements are and how they may overcome them. This is the question I
explore in the next section.

C.

Linking Legal Capacity to a Development Strategy

Despite the potential flexibilities highlighted in the previous section,
structural asymmetries within the WTO make it harder for developing
countries to participate successfully in the WTO dispute resolution system.
Like any change, the transformation of the international trade regime,
from a diplomacy-based to a rule-oriented system, with the creation of the
WTO has created new incentives and privileged certain actors over
others.186 Although several scholars have noted the reduced participation
of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement system, as
compared to developed countries, the explanations for this phenomenon
vary from legal-institutional capacity187 to trade volume and
composition188, to economic resources,189 to power differentials.190 How to
determine with confidence which factor is most relevant is a matter of
current debate. 191
Shaffer, for example, points out that developing countries face several
challenges. They lack expertise in WTO law, financial resources to use the
system, and they are afraid of pressure or potential reprisals by powerful
countries.192 These are “constraints of legal knowledge, financial
endowment, and political power” or “law, money, and politics.”193
186. See, e.g., Shaffer & Nordstrom, supra note 89, at 590 (“In sum, where the procedures are the
same while stakes differ, the system is not neutral to size. Notionally equal litigation rules provide
unequal opportunities for WTO members. Small trading nations are effectively constrained from
being able to use the legal system to the full extent, constituting, in practice, a form of in-built
discrimination.”).
187. See Busch et al., supra note 75, at 576–77 (2009); Conti, Learning to Dispute, supra note 88, at
625–62; Davis & Bermeo, supra note 88; Guzman & Simmons, supra note 75, at 569 (finding that
legal capacity is a better explanation than power in countries’ constraints to participate in dispute
settlement); Shaffer, supra note 75, at 197.
188. See Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis & Håkan Nordström, Is the Use of the WTO Dispute
Settlement System Biased? (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP2340, 1999)
(published in THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW/DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Petros C.
Mavroidis & Alan O. Sykes eds., 2005)).
189. See Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing
Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 861, 865–67 (2005); Shaffer, supra note
75, at 197; Shaffer & Nordstrom, supra note 89.
190. See Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties and
Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 387 (2005) (discussing retaliatory and legal capacity); Pilar
Zejan & Frank L. Bartels, Be Nice and Get Your Money — An Empirical Analysis of WorldTrade
Organization Trade Disputes and Aid, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 1021 (2006).
191. Busch et al., supra note 75; Hoekman et al., supra note 76 (examining developing country
participation in WTO dispute settlement and concluding that once a panel has been formed, there
does not seem to be a difference in losses and wins between developing and developed countries).
192. Shaffer, supra note 75, at 177.
193. Id.
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Developing countries face considerable hurdles in accessing the markets of
other countries. These trade barriers can be significant for the economies
of developing countries.194 If developing countries could challenge these
barriers their economies would benefit. They should be able to do so
through the dispute settlement system, the institutional setting provided by
the WTO. However, despite the system’s recognition of formal equality
not all countries can use it effectively.
In Shaffer’s work, as in many studies about the WTO dispute settlement
system, there is an optimistic note about how once legally-capable
countries are able to spot trade barriers, they would be interested in and
would stand to gain from tearing them down. In this view, investing in
legal capacity allows countries to become “trade-barrier-spotters,” finding
barriers they could challenge for their benefit. Moreover, because every
country has an interest in seeking gains, if everyone has considerable legal
capacity and is able to participate in the dispute settlement system, the
trade regime would be kept in check by its participants, who would shoot
down barriers and prevent other countries from erecting them. This view
is consistent with the assumption that trade liberalization is embedded in
the WTO regime, which the dispute settlement is supposed to serve.
Taking this view to its logical conclusion, some scholars have suggested
having a public prosecutor.195 Because only a few countries are capable of
identifying violations of legal obligations, many go unpunished. If
countries are unable to police their own interests, then a public police
would keep the regime under closer surveillance. The assumption again is
that less trade barriers would be good for everyone, and particularly for
developing countries, which currently are less able to challenge them. This
understanding of legal capacity takes the assumptions of trade
liberalization for granted and seeks to redress the asymmetrical conditions
under which different members participate in the system. It recognizes
that, despite formal equality, there is real inequality of initial material
conditions and that such disparities impact the result. The strategy for
developing countries is one of adapting or “catching-up” with developed
countries to participate on an equal footing. Here, investing in legal
capacity is a key lever in leveling the playing field by helping countries to
become RPs.
Using an alternative approach, I suggest that we invert the starting
question. Instead of asking “why aren’t developing countries using the
system in greater numbers?” or “what stops them from participating in
it?”, we should ask: Why are developing countries using the system? And
what are they using it for? Surely one could argue that it is because
194. Id.
195. See Bernard Hoekman, Strengthening the Global Trade Architecture for Development: The Post Doha
Agenda, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 23, 36 (2002).
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developing countries have enough legal capacity to know their legal
opportunities, financial resources to embark on litigation, and market
power to withstand the process. But this just tells us that these countries
have the means to use the system. In other words, they are using the
system because they can. In contrast, to go deeper into the reasons
developing countries have to use the system is to inquire into their
governments’ economic policy and the domestic interests that stand to
gain.
If we pursue this line of inquiry, an alternative picture emerges. A few
prominent developing countries are using the dispute settlement system to
defend their economic policies against challenges from other countries.
They are also increasingly emboldened to challenge measures of rich
countries that affect the economic interests of their domestic industries.
They have to pick their fights and strategize, choosing which domestic
regulation to defend and which domestic sectors to stand by. And they are
doing this while learning that the rules of the international trade regime are
open-textured and they can push them to accommodate their interests.
Thus, adopting a viewpoint that analyzes why developing countries are
interested in participating in WTO dispute resolution (rather than why
they cannot participate), the concept of legal capacity not only explains
how developing countries can participate more often, but it also reveals
how countries can increase their policy space to achieve a specific
economic objective.
I examine legal capacity not as a question of increasing a country’s
repertoire of legal expertise. To be sure, a proficient knowledge of WTO
law and its operation would be necessary. But I am interested in legal
capacity as a tool that can show the contested nature of legal expertise as
well. One that recognizes that legal expertise is not an objective or neutral
good, but rather a mode of using knowledge in the pursuit of certain
policy goals.196 Viewed in this way, legal capacity can help developing
countries to understand the policy choices behind different interpretations
of WTO rules. It could help them develop their own interpretations that,
while consistent with WTO Agreements, take their interests to heart. From
this perspective, increasing legal capacity is not merely a strategy of
catching up to developed countries through training and technical
assistance.197 Rather, it must be a program that educates a country’s public
196. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY.
L. REV. 5, 19 (2005); see also Andrew T.F. Lang, Legal Regimes and Regimes of Knowledge: Governing Global
Services Trade 38 (LSE Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 15/2009, July 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423538 (noting that legal experts are empowered by “the significant role
in the interpretation of international legal norms”).
197. Indeed, technical assistance might stand in the way of increasing developmental legal
capacity to the extent that technical training promotes the idea that there is a fixed meaning to WTO
restrictions or advances particular interpretations of rules as necessary.
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officials in identifying the normative and policy choices contained in the
WTO rules and the various legal strategies available to them.
To refine this different perspective on legal capacity, I propose a
distinction between “free-trade legal capacity” and “developmental legal
capacity.” Free-trade legal capacity refers to a process of equipping
countries with the appropriate international trade expertise, and litigation
skills to ensure successful participation in the WTO dispute settlement
system. The goal of free-trade legal capacity is to enable developing
countries to gain access to other markets by spotting other countries’ trade
barriers and benefit from further liberalization. The assumption is that if
countries manage to effectively enforce their rights in the WTO, their
economies will stand to gain. In contrast, developmental legal capacity
refers to a process of building lawyering and litigation skills that countries
can use to increase their policy space, which in turn allows them to not
only gain market access, but also to promote and sustain their domestic
industrial policies. The goal of developmental legal capacity is to promote
a country’s development goals within the framework of WTO
Agreements. The assumption is that the WTO Agreements are a
compromise, which countries continue to influence to advance their
interests. These two types of legal capacities originate from divergent
development strategies, which place different value on the objectives of
development of local lawyering skills and strategic, long-term rule-change.
This Part has analyzed how RPs enjoy a privileged position from which
to influence the system in their favor. They use strategic lawyering and
litigation to pursue their policy objectives by changing rule interpretation
over time and by adjusting to the rule in the most favorable way possible.
This Part has explored several domains in which countries can make use of
rule-based and doctrinal flexibilities to pursue their policy objectives.
Finally, this Part examined the relative importance of legal capacity in
enabling a country to pursue its policy goals and argued that the shape of a
country’s legal capacity may be determined, to an important extent, by its
domestic economic development strategy. We are now in a position to see
how these elements combine to delineate a country’s policy autonomy.
It is possible to conceptualize policy autonomy as the available
regulatory space that results from the combination of three factors: rule
and doctrinal flexibility, legal capacity and development strategy.198 Figure
198. The analysis of policy flexibility in the interpretation of international agreements has a
domestic correlative, too. John Jackson has noted how a country’s domestic legal infrastructure can
have serious implications for its policy flexibility. Specifically, whether a country makes treaties
directly applicable in its domestic legal order, and what hierarchy it gives them in relation to federal
laws and the constitution, may matter greatly for that country’s ability to interpret, modify, and
implement its obligations. John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis,
86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310 (1992).
A country whose treaties are directly applicable as domestic law would have no opportunity to
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1, below, illustrates this interaction. Prompted by its own domestic
development goals, a country may mobilize its legal capacity to mine the
rule-based and doctrinal space available in its international obligations. The
domestic development goals refer here to a country’s domestic policy
objective (economic, social, environmental, etc.), which motivates a
country to seek the necessary space to achieve it within its web of
international legal obligations. A country would develop its legal capacity
to be able to pursue its policy goals. This legal capacity would then be
informed by and attuned to the domestic policy goals. Consequently, a
country would deploy its legal capacity to exploit the rule and doctrinal
flexibility available in the legal agreements to assert and expand the policy
autonomy needed to achieve its domestic goals. Conversely, a country with
legal capacity but no domestic development strategy would end up with
less policy autonomy, despite potential rule-based and doctrinal flexibility
and regardless of where it stands on law, money, and power.

interpret the treaty obligations favorably through a statute and would be subject to individuals’
private right of action before domestic courts. In contrast, when treaties are not self-executing,
countries retain more control over the interpretation of the treaty for domestic purposes. This option
prioritizes the domestic democratic process and recognizes that, if the country departs from its
international obligation in implementation, it could be held liable and may have to compensate the
other parties. The attraction of this choice, however, is that the country keeps the option of flexibility
in interpretation and implementation. Id. at 321–30. When, in addition, a direct applicability country
gives treaties higher authority than federal laws, the problem of rigidity is compounded. In that case,
a country has effectively locked in a particular international obligation, and it may not be able to
change it by enacting a subsequent federal law that alters the obligation. In contrast, when the status
of the treaty is lower or equal to federal laws, the country preserves greater policy flexibility on the
domestic impact of the treaty. Id. at 330–34.
As can be gleaned from this analysis, the choices of direct applicability and status of international
treaties can have important consequences for a country’s policy autonomy. Nothing demands that a
country may seek to preserve policy autonomy in all areas. According to Jackson, a country may want
to lock in particular international obligations, like human rights treaties or market-oriented
commitments. This would depend on how much trust there is in the domestic institutions and the
national political process. Id. at 334–37. But these are important choices, and countries with
functional democratic processes may want to preserve control over the particular domestic
compromises they have struck between “economic efficiency and legitimate social goals.” Id. at 338.
Thus, prudent government officials may not want to give away that flexibility. Id. at 340.
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FIGURE 1: POLICY AUTONOMY
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IV. THE CASES OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO
This Part turns to the experiences of Brazil and Mexico to explore how
they have used their legal capacity in the pursuit of policy space and
development strategy in the WTO. These two relatively similarly situated
countries have the two biggest economies in Latin America and both are
firmly inserted into the global economy.199 Brazil and Mexico also share
important parallels in their recent economic history. They adopted similar
economic development models after World War II, embracing policies of
import-substitution industrialization up until the eighties.200 Subsequently,
they both initiated structural liberalization reforms, opening up their
economies to international markets, privatizing state-owned enterprises,
and deregulating the domestic market.201
199. Brazil’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2011 was estimated at approximately $2.28
trillion, while Mexico’s was approximately $1.66 trillion. Brazil ranked eighth in the global economy
and Mexico twelfth. Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), CIA WORLD FACTBOOK,
http://tinyurl.com/83euool (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
200. Diana Alarcon & Terry McKinley, Beyond Import Substitution: The Restructuring Projects of Brazil
and Mexico, 17 LATIN AM. PERSP. 72, 76–77 (1992); see also Werner Baer, Import Substitution and
Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations, 7 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 95 (1972).
201. For a detailed account of how Mexico became an “early liberalizer” in Latin America, see generally
Patrick Cronin, Explaining Free Trade: Mexico, 1985–1988, 45 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 63 (2003).
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An important difference between these countries is that trade represents
a greater percentage of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) than that
of Brazil’s.202 This seems to suggest that Mexico has relied much more on
international trade, rather than on its own domestic market, as an engine
for growth.203 In fact, Mexico is the paradigmatic case of a country that
made trade liberalization its most important economic development
strategy. This liberalization strategy dates back to Mexico’s entry into
GATT in 1986, and was consolidated and expanded by the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Since then successive
governments have further pursued free-trade agreements. Today, in
addition to its NAFTA and WTO obligations, Mexico has entered into
multiple trade agreements with Europe, Japan, and other countries from all
over the world.204 Brazil, on the other hand, was a founding member of
GATT, the WTO, and Mercado Común del Sur (Common Southern Market
or MERCOSUR) and a member of other trade agreements. However, in
what appears to be a strong contrast to Mexico, Brazil resisted efforts to
create a NAFTA-type regime through the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas, arguably because it was not convinced that it was favorable to
its economic interests.205
In social policy, both countries have made comprehensive efforts to
reduce poverty through targeted, conditional cash and transfer programs.
In fact, Brazil’s Bolsa de Familia program, seems to have followed on the
steps of Mexico’s Oportunidades program.206 In the last decade, both
countries have reduced their poverty levels, although at a different rate.207
202. In 2009, exports composed twenty-eight percent of Mexico’s GDP and only eleven percent
of Brazil’s GDP. See World Development Indicators: Exports of Goods and Services, WORLD BANK,
http://tinyurl.com/7zn3rqk (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
203. The growth results in the last decade (2001–2009) also differ. While Brazil has grown at an
average rate of 3.18%, Mexico’s growth rate has been 1.37%. See World Development Indicators: GDP
Growth, WORLD BANK, http://tinyurl.com/78jyvqw (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
204. See generally Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N., Mexico, in 3 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 215–47 (2005); Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N., Mexico’s
Trade Policy: Improvisation and Vision, in THE STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF LATIN AMERICAN TRADE,
213–31 (Vinod Aggarwal, Ralph H. Espach & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 2004). For a brief overview of
Mexico’s trade policy, including its participation in NAFTA and a list of regional trade agreements,
see generally M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40784, MEXICO’S FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS (2010).
205. See Ricardo A. Markwald, The Political Economy of Foreign Trade: The Brazilian Case, in
DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL TRADE STRATEGIES 107–10 (Roberto Bouzas ed.,
2006); SHAFFER J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33258, BRAZILIAN TRADE POLICY
AND THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (2006);
206. For a comparative appraisal of the two programs, see generally Fábio Veras Soares et al.,
Evaluating the Impact of Brazil’s Bolsa Família: Cash Transfer Programs in Comparative Perspective, 45 LATIN
AM. RES. REV 173 (2010). See also Sergei Soares, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Brazil,
Chile, and Mexico: Impacts upon Inequality, International Poverty Centre United Nations
Development Programme Working Paper 35 (April 2007), available at http://www.ipcundp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper35.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
207. In 2001, 35.2% of Brazil’s population lived below the poverty line. By 2010, this number
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Furthermore, average income has increased in both countries.208 As a
result, scholars and policy analysts are increasingly talking about an
important expansion of the middle-class in both countries.209
This Part uses these two countries to explore what seem to be two
divergent trajectories by identifying the different industrial policies and
trade finance mechanisms employed by each country. Despite the
aforementioned differences, Brazil and Mexico are both bound by the
same WTO obligations and are thus arguably equally restricted in their
domestic regulatory space. Moreover, as middle-income countries, they
both rely on considerable economic and human resources that enable
them to actively engage in their respective trade regimes. The analysis
shows, however, that these countries have had different experiences,
suggesting that the existence of regulatory flexibility, or lack thereof,
probably has more to do with a country’s own economic strategy and how
it manages its international agreements to reflect that strategy than is
currently recognized.

A.

Differences in Trade Promotion and Industrial Policy

Both Brazil and Mexico are countries that followed policies of import
substitution industrialization (ISI), starting as early as in the 1930s, reaped
the benefits of the model during the period from the 1950s to 1970s and
faced tremendous difficulties in the 1980s.210 During the debt crisis in the
1980s, however, there was an increasing sense that the ISI model had been
exhausted. Advocates of free trade and economic liberalization advanced a
powerful critique of ISI as the source of the economic crisis and offered a
program of market reform that seemed a compelling, simple solution. This
program included trade liberalization, market deregulation, and
privatization of state owned enterprises.211
decreased to 21.4%. By comparison, 53.6% of Mexico’s population lived below the poverty line in
2000, compared to 47.8% in 2008. Id.
208. In Brazil, gross national income (GNI) per capita over purchasing power parity (PPP) has
grown from $8.960 in 2000 to $14.020 in 2009. Mexico’s has grown from $6.830 in 2000 to $10.160
in 2009. See World Development Indicators: GNI Per Capita, PPP (Current International $), World Bank,
http://tinyurl.com/82te9ge (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
209. See, e.g., JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA, MAÑANA FOREVER?: MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS 34–
67 (2011); Homi Kharas, The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries 31 (OECD Dev. Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 285, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/3b6wvbp.
210. For an overview of the period of import substitution policies in each of these countries see
Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N. & Ricardo Sennes, Brazil y México en la Economía Política Internacional, in
BRASIL Y MÉXICO: ENCUENTROS Y DESENCUENTROS 204–16 (Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N. et al. eds.,
2005).
211. For some of the most powerful critiques of ISI, see generally BÉLA BALASSA, THE NEWLY
INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1981), ANNE O. KRUEGER, POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF POLICY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1993), and DEEPAK LAL, THE
POVERTY OF ‘DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS’ (1983). For an analysis of the market-oriented reforms
in Mexico, see JUAN CARLOS MORENO-BRID & JAIME ROS, DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH IN THE
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Although both Brazil and Mexico embraced this program
enthusiastically, they proceeded at different speeds and in somewhat
different directions.212 Brazil preserved and revamped a number of
development institutions. Moreover, it has reintroduced several industrial
policies and seems to be reengaging more actively in economic planning.
Mexico, on the other hand, was quicker in weakening or dismantling its
development institutions and industrial policies.

1.

Brazil

During the last decade, Brazil has explicitly embraced industrial policy
as a strategy to promote development.213 Arbix and Martin identify four
main components of the emerging development model in Brazil: trade
promotion, industrial policy and science, technology and innovation
policy, finance, and social policy.214 This “Inclusionary State Activism
without Statism”215 model is neither a return to the old developmental
state nor a simple progression from market fundamentalism. Instead, it
reflects an active State that operates under a macroeconomic institutional
framework introduced by the neoliberal economic model but goes beyond
it, imprinting a new direction.216
Brazil’s strategy actively seeks new or deeper markets abroad,217
particularly for its own goods and investment capital.218 This strategy has
brought a welcome diversification in trading partners and goods. Brazil is
moving away from dependence on Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, as its trade with China
and the global south increases. Its exports are also more diverse,
encompassing more sectors and degrees of value added. The commodities
MEXICAN ECONOMY, A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 165 (2009) and ENRIQUE DUSSEL PETERS,
POLARIZING MEXICO: THE IMPACT OF LIBERALIZATION STRATEGY (2000).
212. See Ortiz Mena & Sennes, supra note 210, at 216.
213. This is remarkable given that the term industrial policy was considered a dirty word in
Brazil — as in much of Latin America — ever since the introduction of liberalizing reforms and the
dismantling of the developmental state by the administration of Collor de Mello in 1989. As a once
acting Minister of Finance in Brazil put it: “The best industrial policy is no industrial policy.” Glauco
Arbix & Scott B. Martin, Beyond Developmentalism and Market Fundamentalism in Brazil: Inclusionary State
Activism without Statism 11 (Mar. 12–13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/paper_arbix.pdf (on file with the Virginia Journal of
International Law Association); see also FRANCISCO PANIZZA, CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA:
DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS (2009); Luiz Carlos
Bresser-Pereira, Structuralist Macroeconomics and the New Developmentalism 2 (Oct. 19, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law Association).
214. Arbix & Martin, supra note 213, at 15.
215. Id. at 7.
216. Id. at 7.
217. Id. at 15; see also Gregory Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind
Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383 (2008).
218. Arbix & Martin, supra note 213, at 17.
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sector, for instance, includes now not only simple commodities but also
value-added commodities such as ethanol.219
But Brazil’s strategy has also entailed the aggressive defense of domestic
measures of selective protection used to promote its domestic firms.220
Starting with the government of Cardoso and strengthened by the Lula
administration, Brazil has created a host of new institutions and programs
to advance a national industrial policy.221 In addition, existing institutions
have been reinforced.222 Finally, a key focus of Brazil’s industrial policy in
this new era is on innovation and technological development.223 Between
219. Id. at 15–16 (“[E]ven within a context of openness that policy elites across the last two
presidencies have not just accepted but actively embraced — in a historic shift for Brazil — the state
has not taken that simple cue to retreat into a passive ‘laissez faire’ position of accepting Brazil’s
inherited comparative advantage of current structure of imports and exports and trading partners.”).
Id. at 16.
220. “[W]hile the country has perhaps not been as aggressive as some East Asian countries [in
using selective protection tools] Brasilia has not shied away from a sometimes aggressive defense of
measures such as the automotive regime of the mid to late 1990s (forcing multinationals to invest
directly in the country if they wished to receive lower tariffs on imports).” Id. at 16.
221. These institutions include the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Commerce in 1999,
the National Agency for Industrial Development (Agencia Brasileira de Desenvolvimiento Industrial —
ABDI) and the Council for Industrial Development (Conselho de Desenvolvimento Industrial — CNDI) in
2004. The Lula administration issued two main sets of industrial policies in 2004 and 2008. The first
one focused on innovation and is managed by ABDI. The second one, called Policy for Productive
Development (PDP) was developed by the President’s Chief of Staff and emphasized investment for
capacity-building in several areas. Arbix & Martin, supra note 213, at 17.
222. Arbix and Martin particularly note the Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (Financing Agency for
Studies and Projects — FINEP) under the Ministry of Science and Technology, which funds basic
and applied research for public and private projects. Id. at 18. They also point to institutions that play
a similar role at the state level. Id.
223. Id. at 18 (“The goal of industrial policy under Lula has been to redefine the policy’s scope
and tools, to drive the country into knowledge-intensive sectors, seen as the only way to sustain longterm growth. In sum, industrial policies of the present are essentially different than past experiences,
and are innovation-oriented. As there is not too much room left for protectionism, not for any
autarkic development, state interventions must be very different from what they were during the
heyday of the developmental state.”). For a critical perspective on Brazil’s industrial policy, see
generally Mansueto de Almeida, Desafios de Real Politica Industrial Brasileira Do Seculo XXI (IPEA,
Working Paper 1452, 2009). De Almeida argues that Brazil’s industrial policy still focused too much
on sectors where Brazil already was competitive (low-medium tech) and where the promotion of
innovation did not contribute to export growth. Brazil’s most competitive industries in 2008 were
exactly the same as those in 1996, despite the government’s efforts to promote technology-intensive
sectors. In addition, De Almeida faults BNDES’s policy of encouraging internationalization and
mergers and acquisitions as not really compatible with industrial policy, and causing an appreciation
of the Real, which in turn reinforced the existing structure in Brazil (i.e., benefiting sectors with high
margins and strong competitiveness, and hindering the emergence of new sectors). He is also critical
of BNDES’s strategy of aiming to consolidate the leadership position of certain Brazilian companies
in the global value chain because it does not factor in the necessity that these companies should
gradually move up within the production chain, to get more value-added, and because such
concentration makes it harder for small enterprises lower in the production chain to flourish (since
they essentially face an oligopsony. Mansueto De Almeida, The New Old Industrial Policy, VALOR
ECONÔMICO, Jul. 17, 2009; available at http://tinyurl.com/6oqxkks (“But the current industrial
policy in Brazil does not correspond to that written on the official documents, does not impose
performance requirements on private firms and, in many cases, the policies adopted are against the
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2000 and 2008, government spending in science, technology and
innovation increased from $14.3 billion to $43.4 billion. Investment in
research and development went up from 0.97 % of GDP in 2005 to 1.13%
of GDP in 2008.224

2.

Mexico

Industrial policy shifted from occupying a central role in the state’s
economic policies to a minimal, almost unnoticeable position.225 Since the
economic liberalization reforms of the 1980s, the Mexican government has
dismantled most of its former industrial policies, which had been
supported by subsidies, trade protection, tax incentives, and performance
requirements.226 A few government programs, however, devised to help
small- and medium-sized enterprises, as well as credit and capacity-building
assistance for exporting firms remained. The primary government program
for the promotion of industry is a tax-free regime for the temporary
importation of inputs used in export goods.227
Mexico’s position regarding industrial policies since the liberalization
reforms can be summed up in three phases.228 In the first phase, from the
mid-eighties to 1994, the government dismantled most of its existing
industrial policies.229 Government support shifted from sector-specific
programs to general programs available to anyone. In the second phase,
from 1994 to 2000, the government sought to address the increasing
actual definition of what we understand by ‘industrial policy.’”) (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). Another
assessment of the overall efficacy of the industrial policy shows that no major shift in production
sectors has occurred, but that industrial performance and exports overall have increased considerably.
Claudio Robert Amitrano, O modelo de crescimento da economia brasileira no periodo recente: condicionantes,
caracteristicas e limites, 7 POLITICA ECONOMICA EM FOCO 206, 215 (2005/2006). The strongest
growth within industry came from extractive industries, capital goods productions, and durable
consumer goods. Id. at 220. High-tech, despite its fast growth, only made up 9% of the economy and
does not figure highly in exports either. Id. at 225. This view attributes industrial performance mostly
to a strong growth of the global economy — resulting in increased exports — and, to a lesser degree,
to state interventions, including increased available of credit, export promotion, and the incentives
that form part of the industrial policy. Id. at 224–25.
224. Arbix & Martin, supra note 213, at 20. Arbix and Martin highlight the National Plan for
Science, Technology and Innovations Systems, which prioritized funding of innovation in firms. The
government uses tax incentives and subsidies to support the creation and diffusion of technology in
established and start-up companies.
225. Enrique Dussel Peters, Industrial Policy, Regional Trends, and Structural Change in Mexico’s
Manufacturing Sector, in CONFRONTING DEVELOPMENT: ASSESSING MEXICO’S ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL POLICY CHALLENGES 241, 245–49 (Kevin J. Middlebrook & Eduardo Zepeda eds., 2003).
226. MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 165. (stating that a number of industries, such as
the automotive, textile, electronics, footwear, appliances, steel, petrochemical, and canned foodstuff
industries, initially retained their protections, but they were ultimately phased out); see also Kendra
Sawyer Leith, Challenges for Implementing Industrial Policy in Mexico 47 (June 2009) (M.C.P. thesis,
Mass. Inst. Tech.), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/50111.
227. MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 167.
228. See id. at 165–67.
229. Id. at 165–66.
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erosion of linkages in domestic production chains and limited value-added
in exports, which resulted from its trade liberalization policies. It
recognized the need for selective support to help some sectors become
more competitive in the exports market.230 Although the government
started a variety of programs, the key policy measure consisted of tax
exemptions on temporary imports used for export products.231 Seeking to
increase the competitiveness of domestic firms, other programs focused
on administrative simplification of government support and on support
for firms’ marketing strategies. In the third phase, from 2000 to date, the
government has, if more in rhetoric than in practice, explicitly recognized
the role of the state in the promotion of economic growth.232 It has
identified priority industries and offers preferential financial support.233
Despite this gradual change of position, however, government support
remains limited and its effects have not been significant.234

B.

Differences in Development Banks and Export Finance

In both countries, development banks have recently served a crucial
role as buffers from the full impact of the 2008 financial crisis by injecting
230. Id. at 166.
231. After the economic crisis of 1994–1995, the Zedillo administration launched the Program
for Industrial Policy and Foreign Trade (PROPICE). It is worth noting that “[the program] explicitly
excluded the notion of going back to trade protectionism or granting financial or tax subsidies to
promote exports or investment.” Id. at 166. In practice, the program granted tax rebates and
accelerated the elimination of tariffs for certain imported inputs. Id. Additional programs included
the Program for Temporary Importation to Produce Export Goods (PITEX) and Highly Exporting
Firms (ALTEX), which offered exporters a tax-free regime for the temporary importation of inputs.
Another program, the Mexican System of External Promotion (SIMPEX) sought to advertise
investment opportunities in Mexico and to help domestic companies market their products for
export. Id. at 166–67.
232. In 2000, however, the name of the ministry traditionally in charge of economic promotion
changed from Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Promotion (SECOFI) to simply Secretariat of
Economy. The name change probably acknowledges that the function of industrial promotion, which
used to be at the core of this ministry, is now peripheral.
233. The Fox administration (2000–2006), explicitly recognized the role of the state in promoting
international competitiveness and stated the need for sector-specific programs as a development
strategy. In a departure from previous practice, the government offered financial support in
preferential conditions to these industries. But the strategy turned out to be much less
comprehensive than announced. Moreover, due to the programs’ limited funds and delay in their
implementation, analysts doubt they had any significant impact. MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note
211, at 167. The Calderon administration (2006–2012) has made the improvement of the country’s
competitiveness the cornerstone of its economic policy. See Eje 2. Economía competitiva y generadora de
empleos,
Plan
Nacional
de
Desarrollo
[The
National
Development
Plan],
http://pnd.calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/economia-competitiva-y-generadora-de-empleos.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2012). However, there seems to be no coherent plan except for tariff reductions. The
country’s industrial policy is in a chaotic situation exactly when the manufacturing sector is in one of
its worst crises in decades. Enrique Dussel Peters, La manufactura Mexicana, ¿Opciones de Recuperación?,
ECONOMÍA INFORMA (2009), available at http://dusselpeters.com/40.pdf (on file with the Virginia
Journal of International Law Association).
234. MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 167.

2012]

POLICY AUTONOMY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

603

credit to the economy. Thus, banks in both countries have seen their
budgets grow, as they are used in a counter-cyclical fashion to minimize
the effects of the crisis. But beyond this shared objective, the functioning
of the development banks in both countries shows two different visions of
how to use public finance to support domestic industries and promote
exports.
First, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES)235 has a much larger
budget than Nafinsa and Bancomext (the two main Mexican development
banks) combined.236 In 2010, BNDES made three times the aggregate
disbursements that all the Mexican development banks made. In fact, by
2009, BNDES was one of the largest development banks in the world,
with $222 billion in assets,237 lending more funds annually than the World
Bank.238 BNDES’s lending during the recent economic crisis alone
accounted for 37% of capital provided in the Brazilian economy and its
role has become increasingly important.239 BNDES is the primary source
of credit in the Brazilian economy and operates partly through “secondtier” banks, creating a partnership with the financial sector that helps
increase the coverage of BDNES.240 By contrast, as a result of the
liberalization reforms introduced in the 1980s and 1990s in Mexico,
development banks were downsized and their purpose transformed.241 The
235. BNDES: BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, http://tinyurl.com/3tn86vz (last visited Mar.
18, 2012).
236. Nafinsa was created in 1933 as the country’s first development bank in charge of financing
long-term industrial development. See MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 86. NAFIN has been
touted as one of the most successful development banks. See, e.g., JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L
DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 286 (3d ed. 2009). Bancomext was created in
1937 for the promotion of exports. Scholars credit these development banks, and especially Nafinsa,
for having played a crucial role in enabling Mexico’s industrialization during the period of “stabilizing
development” in 1940–1970. See MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 86–88.
Nafinsa established in 1941 a department of promotion and began to make systematic
studies of industrial development projects. With a predilection for manufacturing, it
promoted enterprises in practically every sector of the Mexican economy over the course of
the next several years. The roster of firms aided by loan, guarantee, or purchase of stocks
and bonds reads like a ‘who’s who’ of Mexican business.
Calvin Blair, Nacional Financiera, in PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO 193, 213
(Raymond Vernon ed., 1964).
237. Luciano Coutinho, The Role of Development Banks for Growth in Emerging Economies, in
RENCONTRES ÉCONOMIQUES D’AIX-EN-PROVENCE: À LA RECHERCHE DE LA NOUVELLE
CROISSANCE 263, 264 (Le Cercle des economists ed., 2010).
238. David M. Trubek, Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of
Development and Law 25 (U. Wis. Law Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 1075, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349163.
239. Coutinho, supra note 237, at 266.
240. Id. at 265.
241. While before the liberalization period Nafinsa lent directly to firms, after the 1990s reforms
it became a second-tier bank giving out loans through private intermediaries. BARBARA STALLINGS &
ROGERIO STUDART, FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT: LATIN AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 219 (2006). The results of privatization and liberalization reforms have not improved
the availability of credit in the economy and thus finance continues to be a key obstacle for growth.
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privatization of state-owned firms, many of which were financed by
Nafinsa, and the dismantling of industrial policy ultimately reduced the
scope of these banks’ activities.
Second, BNDES has a much wider range of business objectives,
ranging from venture capital to microfinance. BNDES is set up to make
credit available on a “horizontal basis,”242 meaning that firms in almost any
sector can access funding. However, the government in its Production
Development Policy (Politica de Desenvolvimento Produtivo) has also identified
“priority areas” that receive more and better access to funding.243 BNDES
has thus facilitated growth in Brazil by expanding productivity,244 fostering
job creation,245 and facilitating the growth of many industries, such as the
successful Brazilian air-manufacturing industry.246
By contrast, although Mexico’s Nafinsa has a variety of objectives, it has
devoted most of its resources to facilitating credit for small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). But even in this area, its financing is clearly insufficient
and not supplemented by robust private bank lending to SMEs.247
Mexico’s domestic financing to firms represents 28% of its GDP, which
pales in comparison to Brazil’s 82%.248 Moreover, this scarce pool of
capital is only available to a small number of very large, elite firms, which
are often able to find other financing sources themselves in the
MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 248. Moreover, the “downsizing and weakening of
development banks (NAFINSA and BANCOMEXT) brought about by the reform process made
bank lending to firms more scarce.” Id. Stallings and Studart note that “[u]ntil Mexico has a deeper
domestic financial system and provides broader access, long-term growth that encompasses the
domestic economy as well as exports will be hard to generate.” STALLINGS & STUDART, supra, at 185.
242. Coutinho, supra note 237.
243. The priority areas include “investments to expand capacity, enhance productivity in strategic
sectors, promote exports and increase the value added in the manufacturing sector.” Id. In 2010,
BNDES disbursed $96.3 billion, of which $45.2 billion (47%) went to industry, $29.8 billion (31%) to
infrastructure, $15.4 billion (16%) to trade and services, and $5.7 billion (6 %) to farming. Performance
Report, BNDES, (Dec. 11, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/6nrknaf (last visited Mar. 18, 2012); see also
Performance: The Evolution of the BNDES’ Disbursements, BNDES, http://tinyurl.com/823s9cu (last
visited Mar. 18, 2012).
244. See Luiz A. Esteves et al., BNDES, Technological Innovation and Performance of Brazilian Industrial
Enterprises, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD CONFERENCE ON MICRO EVIDENCE OF INNOVATION
IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (2009), available at http://tinyurl.com/7dnwwgy (last visited Mar. 18,
2012).
245. See Ernani Teixeira Torres Filho & Fernando Pimentel Puga, Empresas Apoiadas Pelo BNDES
Geram Mais Emprego e Pagam Mais [Firms Supported by BNDES Create More Jobs and Pay More], 17
BNDES VISÃO DE D ESENVOLVIMENTO [Vision of Development] (2006).
246. See Regis Bonelli & Armando Castelar Pinheiro, New Export Activities in Brazil: Comparative
Advantage, Policy or Self-Discovery? (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. R-551, 2008), available at
http://tinyurl.com/6ntl8t8 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
247. Stallings and Studart note that “[u]ntil Mexico has a deeper domestic financial system and
provides broader access, long-term growth that encompasses the domestic economy as well as
exports will be hard to generate.” BARBARA STALLINGS & ROGERIO STUDART, FINANCE FOR
DEVELOPMENT: LATIN AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 185 (2006).
248. Id.
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international markets anyway. The majority of domestic firms, therefore,
have to rely on retained earnings and other sources of funding.249
Third, BNDES aims to facilitate long-term investment in productive
activities. According to the government “Growth Acceleration Program,”
BNDES is expected to play an active role in the expansion of Brazil’s
infrastructure, focusing on providing loans to the following sectors: energy
transmission and distribution, gas, and oil production and distribution,
railways, ports, airports, roadways, water and sanitation, and urban
transportation.250 By contrast, Mexico’s Nafinsa has increasingly focused
on short-term lending to finance working capital and address immediate
liquidity problems.251 It has been relegated to second-tier banking and
limited to support private banking.252
Fourth, BNDES is aggressively promoting Brazil’s exports and
supporting Brazilian companies abroad. BNDES lends to companies
primarily focused on capital goods, engineering/construction services and
software.253 In addition, BNDES supports Brazil’s social agenda by
249. Id. Scholars identify several problems in the finance sector, such as “the high segmentation
and shallowness of the banking system, the lack of capital markets, and the scarcity of long-term
finance, particularly for start-up innovative firms.” MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 248.
Moreover, the “downsizing and weakening of development banks (NAFINSA and BANCOMEXT)
brought about by the reform process made bank lending to firms more scarce.” Id.
250. BNDES — Fifty Years of Development, BNDES (Sept. 2002), http://tinyurl.com/83ugtmg
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012). BNDES has established guidelines for Micro, Small, and Medium-sized
Enterprises (MSME), which focus on providing loans to allow scaling and implementation of
innovative products and processes. BNDES Annual Report 2008, BNDES 70–71 (2008),
http://tinyurl.com/7p3mw3x (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). In 2010, BNDES expected to distribute
$1.4 billion for innovation for MSMEs alone, and spent $18 billion supporting small and medium
sized firms during the twelve months ending in April of 2010. Id. Despite the fact that small and
medium-sized enterprises are a priority area, they account for a quarter of total loans. Management
Report-BNDES Group, BNDES (June 30, 2009) http://tinyurl.com/7jztcng (last visited Mar. 18,
2012). While the number of operations for MSMEs accounted for 93% of all operations, funding
only accounted for 27% of disbursements. Performance Report, supra note 243.
251. Nafinsa has been lauded as a successful example of a developing country using solutions
such as “reverse factoring” to enable the short-term financing of SMEs. For a largely positive
account of Nafinsa’s program and how it works, see Leora Klapper, The Role of Factoring for Financing
Small and Medium Enterprises, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 3111, 3124–29 (2006). For a critical assessment
of this retreat from clear development goals to short-term financing, see Alejandra Salas-Porras, Basis
of Support and Opposition for the Return of a Developmental State in Mexico, PONTO DE VISTA, Aug. 2009, at
20. For another very critical assessment by former federal legislator Suárez Dávila, see Roberto
González Amador, Censura Suárez Dávila que se Desmantele la Banca de Desarrollo [Suárez Dávila Censors
the Dismantling of Development Banking], LA JORNADA (Jan. 19, 2008),
http://tinyurl.com/6vg9r7s (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
252. “Nafin has been transformed into a second-tier bank, with special responsibility for SMEs.
Five other development banks carried out more specific mandates: Bancomext (foreign trade,
especially export finance, Banobras (infrastructure), Banrural (agriculture), Fina (sugar) and
Banejercito (banking services for military personnel).” STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 247, at
197; see also id. at 219.
253. This lending accounted for seventy-two percent of total disbursements. BNDES Annual
Report 2008, supra note 250, at 124.
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assessing projects based on their environmental impact on the country and
serving as a microfinance bank to provide credit to poor Brazilians.254
In contrast, Bancomext’s budget has been reduced and the government
has informally merged Nafinsa and Bancomext.255 Mexico has also
gradually been dismantling Bancomext, reassigning functions of the latter
to a trust for foreign investment called Pro-México.256 In addition, it has
given the Ministry of the Economy, through the program Pymes, a quasibanking role with no clear targets or oversight.257
At the core, there seems to be a different vision about the role the
government should play in the economy and how it can create the policy
tools to advance its agenda through development banking. While banks in
both countries underwent important transformations after the
liberalization reforms, BNDES has been given an explicit mission of
promoting and financing industrial policy in strategic sectors. In contrast,
Nafinsa and Bancomext have been retooled as supplements of the private
sector, helping some firms to be able to eventually access private capital.258

C.

Legal Capacity in the Service of Policy Autonomy

Having analyzed the differences in the two countries’ development
strategies, this Section describes how these differences are reflected in
Brazil’s and Mexico’s litigation patterns and dispute settlement
experiences. Specifically, I examine how the experience of each country is
underpinned by a different mode of legal capacity. This Article has
previously argued that policy autonomy is the space that a country can
create by mobilizing its legal capacity to use the rule and doctrinal
flexibility of the WTO in the service of a development strategy.259 In the
254. BNDES — Fifty Years of Development, supra note 250.
255. Amador, supra note 251. Some analysts perceive the new objectives of the development
banks to be too narrow and too reliant on a failing market. They advocate a more robust role for
development banking, focused not on liquidity and working capital but on long-term productive
investment, prioritizing small and medium enterprises. In addition, they consider that development
banks should be able to work as direct lenders and obtain funding through issuing bonds. Mexico
Frente a la Crisis: Hacia un Nuevo Curso de Desarrollo 23–24 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.nuevocursodedesarrollo.unam.mx/docs/Mexico_frente_a_la_Crisis.pdf (last visited
Mar. 18, 2012).
256. Amador, supra note 251.
257. Id.
258. Critics of BNDES argue that it is expanding too aggressively, crowding out private banking
in the financial sector. See Brazil’s development bank: Central planning, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2009, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/13496820 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). On the other hand,
critics of Nafinsa and Bancomext argue that the development banks are ineffective because they fail
to realize their potential ability to expand and reinvigorate the banking and financial system in the
country. The latter critics see the limited role of development banking as a reason for the lack of
sustained economic growth in Mexico. MORENO BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 248 Mexico Frente a
la Crisis: Hacia un Nuevo Curso de Desarrollo, supra note 255, at 7, 23–24.
259. See supra Figure 1.
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case of Brazil, the development strategy that animates the country’s legal
capacity is industrial policy. The following table illustrates the relationship
between these factors.
FIGURE 2: BRAZIL’S POLICY AUTONOMY

Development
Strategy
(Selective Trade &
Industrial Policy)

Rule and
Doctrinal
Flexibility in
Legal
Obligations

Policy
Autonomy

Legal Capacity

In the case of Mexico, the development strategy is one of free trade
liberalization. Under this paradigm, since WTO obligations already
encapsulate the development strategy, these elements appear side by side
in the diagram below. The scope of what the government can or cannot do
is considered as already delineated by its WTO commitments and thus
there is no need to look for more space through rule or doctrinal
flexibilities. The country uses its legal capacity primarily to enforce its
obligations in the system.
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FIGURE 3: MEXICO’S POLICY AUTONOMY

International
Obligations

Development
Strategy
(Free Trade)

Policy
Autonomy

Legal Capacity

The dispute-settlement experiences of Brazil and Mexico exhibit a
pattern that seems consistent with this distinction. While Mexico’s
development policy has remained largely lodged within the Washington
Consensus paradigm, Brazil has put in place a growth strategy program
based on deliberate industrial policies to promote specific economic
sectors. Each country’s development strategy is reflected in the challenges
that these two countries have chosen to initiate as complainants and those
that they have had to defend as respondents. Brazil, on the one hand, has
forcefully promoted its exports abroad by challenging a variety of trade
barriers, but it has also used the dispute settlement to defend several of its
industrial programs that seem to contravene the WTO. Mexico, on the
other hand, is largely concerned about ensuring market access for its
exports in other countries and about fending off unfair competition caused
by foreign imports at home.

1.

Differences in Legal Capacity

Perhaps due to their different development strategies and priorities,
these countries exhibit different types of legal capacities. Both countries
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have competent lawyers who are experts in international trade law. But
there are also important institutional and strategic differences that reflect
divergent policies about how to create, foster, and deploy legal capacity.

a.

Brazil

Brazil has built an institutional legal infrastructure that includes a trade
team in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, a variety of intra-ministerial trade
groups, and established coordination mechanisms between the
government and the private sector and civil society. The Foreign Ministry
lawyers have been sent for training to Brazil’s permanent mission in the
WTO and to trade litigation firms in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere. As
a result, Brazil has created a cadre of lawyers who are able to represent the
government in the WTO dispute settlement system.260
Brazil exhibits what can be described as developmental legal capacity,
geared to advance the country’s industrial policy agenda through the
government’s promotion of select, targeted sectors. An important aspect
of Brazil’s legal capacity is making sure that the country’s legal strategies
accord with the government’s interests, not only for a given case but also
systemically for the future. So far, Brazil has been able to defend several of
its industrial policies in the WTO against challenges from countries that
claimed they were violations of its WTO obligations.261

b.

Mexico

The experience of Mexico presents a different picture.262 There is a unit
in charge of international trade in the Ministry of the Economy, which was
first created to provide legal advice for and participated in the NAFTA
negotiations. This office is now in charge of international trade
negotiations and dispute resolution.263 Although several very competent
lawyers have worked and developed their careers in that office, there is a
different institutional approach than that of Brazil’s. Over the years, there
260. Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Developmental Responses to the International Trade Game:
Examples of Intellectual Property and Export Credit Law Reforms in Brazil 14–15 (2011) (on file with the
Virginia Journal of International Law Association); Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning, supra note 217,
at 424, 428–29. It should be noted that the government of Brazil has frequently resorted to hiring
outside counsel, particularly from the United States, even though it has a trained domestic team of
lawyers working for the government.
261. See Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning, supra note 217, at 413–22.
262. Research for this section was based on semi-structured interviews with current and former
Mexican government officials.
263. This unit is called the Office of Legal Counsel for Trade Negotiations. It provides legal
advise to the Ministry of the Economy in trade and investment negotiations, free trade and
investment promotion, implementation of existing agreements, and dispute settlement proceeding.
For an organizational chart of the Ministry of the Economy, see Secretaría de Economía, available at
http://www.economia.gob.mx/images/ConoceSE/organigramafinal.png (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
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has been considerable turnover and limited institutional continuity to take
advantage of accumulated knowledge and experience.264 There are few
incentives for people to stay and ascend the career ladder, eventually
pushing them out and losing valuable human capital. This may reflect a
problem of design in the civil service career structure.265
In addition, the Ministry of the Economy has largely relied on outside
legal counsel — primarily from the United States and Canada — for
preparation of its cases and for lawyering strategies.266 There seems to be
no movement towards investing in and training a cadre of Mexican lawyers
that can do the bulk of the lawyering and litigation.267 Of course, there is
nothing wrong in working with outside foreign counsel; given the highly
technical aspects of WTO litigation, it may well be essential, particularly at
the beginning of a country’s participation in the WTO legal system. But
developing one’s own legal capacity and moving toward greater autonomy
might yield considerable advantages, including saving the government
important resources.268 In addition, it may generate legal capacity spillovers
264. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author); Phone interview with former official #6 at
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (on file with author). Phone Interview
with official #3 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 31, 2011)
(on file with author) (stating that while many of the lawyers who negotiated NAFTA remain in office
in the United States and Canada, “everybody is gone in Mexico”). This is particularly worriesome in
light of scholars’ account of important accumulated experience is and how legal capacity and
expertise accrue primarily to individuals. See Conti, Learning to Dispute, supra note 88, at 625.
265. Phone Interview with official #3 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in
Washington, D.C. (Jan 31, 2011) (stating that even though a civil service carrer statute exists it is
badly designed. While the statute establishes conditions of entry, it does not really establish the
conditions to create a public service career).
266. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author). Phone interview with former official #6 at
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that
recently, the Office of Legal Counsel has begun to write its briefs in some cases, depending on the
dispute. Stating also that Mexico had a rule whereby only Mexican lawyers would represent Mexico in
oral arguments before international panels). Indeed, a small number of lawyers from the United
States and Canada providing outside legal counsel to the Secretariat since NAFTA seems to be the
main point of continuity. This small number of foreign legal advisors remained the same until the
current administration began to expand the pool. Phone Interview with official #3 at the Ministry of
the Economy [name withheld], in Washington, D.C. (Jan 31, 2011).
267. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author). Phone interview with former official #6 at
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (on file with author).
268. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld]
(Oct. 6, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that relying to such an extent on outside counsel is not
only costly, it also may hamper the development of local capacities that could complement or
eventually substitute outside advice, at least at the strategic level of litigation). “The government
spends too much money in outside counsel. It would be better to spend that money to gradually
create a group of first-rate in house lawyers within the government. The result would be a strong
group of well-paid in-house lawyers.” This would save money, but most importantly, it would build
capacity in the government. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name
withheld], in Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that it would be hard to
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to the private sector, where private law firms and companies would benefit
from the services of competent domestic lawyers.269
Moreover, there is a noticeable lack of coordination between the trade
unit in the Ministry of the Economy and other government Ministries and
agencies as well as within the Ministry of the Economy itself.270 For
instance, there is scant coordination between the Ministry of the Economy
offices in charge of trade promotion and the Ministry of the Economy
offices responsible for industry promotion.271 There are institutional
channels for coordination between the Ministry of the Economy and the
private sector, but this interaction largely depends on the initiative of
representatives of economic sectors to approach the government. This
institutional setup generally favors large firms and established industrial
interests at the expense of medium and small enterprises.272 In addition,
there is practically no outreach to civil society groups.273
The apparent lack of coordination suggests that there are no
overarching, explicit economic policies that the Mexican government is
interested in advancing. Instead, Mexico adheres to the agendas that are
assumed to be embedded within its international trade agreements. The
Office of the Legal Counsel takes the cases as they come; each case is a
separate problem with no relation between each other or to a deliberate
agenda.274 Thus, the cases undertaken by Mexico are not systemic, in the
sense that they are not designed to change the rules of the game or to

entirely do without outside counsel but that the government could use it for a second opinion,
without heavily relying on them and at a considerably lower cost).
269. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld]
(Oct. 6, 2011) (stating that there is a dearth of lawyers trained in international trade law in the country
and there are no Mexican law firms specialized in WTO or NAFTA. This capacity-building could
have spill-over effects as some lawyers would eventually enter the private sector. This in-house team
would be a seeder for international trade lawyers in the country); Interview with former official #1 at
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with
author).
270. Antonio Ortiz Mena, The Domestic Determinants of Mexico’s Trade Strategy, in THE DOMESTIC
DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL TRADE STRATEGIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MERCOSUR
COUNTRIES, MEXICO, AND CHILE 230–32 (Roberto Bouzas ed., 2006).
271. Interview with official #4 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in Mexico City,
Mex. (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author).
272. Mena, supra note 270, at 239–41. Interview with official #4 at the Ministry of the Economy
[name withheld], in Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that strong
industries whose interests the government has agreed to represent have worked in tandem with the
government during litigation).
273. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld]
(Oct. 6, 2011). See also Mena, supra note 270, at 229–41.
274. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld]
(Oct. 6, 2011) (stating that lawyers are a tool but like the external counsel, they do not make policy.
This is something that has to be set by the deputy minister). “We were never influenced by policy
decisions. We undertook the disputes as they came.” Id.
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make the rules more favorable to its interests. Rather, they seek primarily
to provide immediate relief.275

2.

Differences in Policy Objectives

The differences in the approaches to legal capacity by Brazil and Mexico
can be explained in terms of policy, even if an implicit one, rather than at
the level of State competence or individual expertise or professionalism.
Each approach seems to track individual positions regarding free trade and
industrial policy, particularly as to the role of the state in supporting
domestic infant industries, only this time in legal services. Brazil, on the
one hand, seems interested in creating its own domestic “industry” in
international trade law legal services by investing heavily in the training of
government in-house lawyers. It has also stimulated “technology” or
expertise transfer (in the form of legal knowledge) from outside foreign
counsel to Brazilian government lawyers and to the private sector. By
hiring legal services from Brazilian law firms, it is cultivating a domestic
market, albeit still small, in the field. And it is deliberately generating
linkages between government lawyers and other government ministries, as
well as with the private sector and civil society.
Mexico’s approach to creating legal capacity, on the other hand, is more
consistent with its free-trade orientation. It has in place a competent team
of lawyers who can perform the basic governmental function of legal
representation and participation in the WTO system. It has additionally
“imported” legal services, buying those services it considers optimal from
the international market. Mexico thus seems to have put fewer resources
into building its own in-house or domestic legal capacity. As a result, the
state plays no role in generating legal capacity in the domestic private
sector through the promotion of technology transfers or domestic
government procurement. Nor does the Mexican government seek to
establish deliberate linkages with the private sector or civil society.
In Brazil the prominence of international trade policy has risen and is
undoubtedly at the forefront of the country’s international and domestic
agenda. There is considerable discussion about the role of Brazil in the
WTO and about how it may advance its interests using the system.276 In
275. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that the cases that Mexico undertakes
are not systemic and that Mexico’s interpretation of its trade Agreements is rather conservative,
staying within the limits of what has been tried out). “Mexico is the champion of compliance. Mexico
is more papist than the Pope.” Id. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the
Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (stating that Mexico does not have a case like BrazilCotton). “Trade lawyering and litigation has never been conceived as a tool for trade policy.” Id.
276. See, for example, Brazil’s effort to include currency manipulation measures under the WTO.
Jonathan Wheatley & Joe Leahy, Trade War Looming, Warns Brazil, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011,
http://tinyurl.com/7seafqe (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). Interview with former official #2 at the
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contrast, in Mexico, trade policy seems to be on the wane. By and large,
the development discussion in Mexico is about second-generation
domestic reforms. The international trade obligations are for the most part
taken for granted and the focus is on what other structural reforms are
pending. Those reflecting on the experience of the Mexican legal team that
negotiated NAFTA and was to take charge of international trade in the
Ministry of the Economy speak of trade as a part of a state policy and
vision for the country that no longer exists.277

3.

Differences in Litigation Experience

This Section selects some of the most important cases that Brazil and
Mexico have participated in, either as a complainant or a respondent.278
These cases illustrate how different development strategies translate into
different lawyering objectives. Brazil uses its legal capacity to expand its
policy space and promote its industrial policies. Mexico uses its legal
capacity to enforce what it assumes to be its existing international trade
obligations and defend itself against unfair trade practices.
As should be clear by the end of this analysis, the litigation experience
of Brazil and Mexico shows that, when a country has a clear development
goal and has built the legal capacity to pursue it, a country can create policy
space and exploit the latent flexibilities in the WTO regime. This flexibility
for policy autonomy is often invisible and cannot be taken for granted.
Rather, it results from a country’s deliberate strategy to pursue a
development goal within the WTO framework, testing its limits, and
seeking to obtain the most advantage of it.

Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author).
(stating that Brazil is an example of a country that stands for itself. The cases of aircraft and
intellectual property show how Brazil uses the DSB to achieve certain ends, both geopolitical and
domestic).
277. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author). Phone interview with former official #6 at
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (stating that the centrality of
international trade in the country’s economic and political agenda has declined and with it, so is the
power and influence that the Trade Division and the Ministry of the Economy exercises within the
government). Phone Interview with official #3 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in
Washington, D.C. (Jan 31, 2011) (stating that “trade policy has stopped being a priority for Mexico”).
278. Brazil has been involved in twenty-five cases as complainant and fourteen as respondent.
Mexico has been involved in twenty-one cases as complainant and fourteen as respondent. WORLD
TRADE ORG., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 88 (2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/6st32nn (last visited
Mar. 18, 2012).
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Brazil has actively promoted its exports in other countries, ensuring
market access and equal treatment. On this score, Brazil has been fairly
successful as a complainant. Indeed, Brazil’s record as a complainant,
particularly against the United States and Europe, has been more effective
than Mexico’s.279
One example is the dispute between Brazil and the United States
concerning cotton. Brazil argued that the U.S. cotton subsidies280 violated
several WTO agreements, including the Subsidies Agreement, the
Agricultural Agreement, and GATT.281 The dispute resulted in five
different opinions from Panels and the Appellate Body and will be
undoubtedly influential in future cases concerning agriculture, subsidies,
and countervailing measures. Both the Panel and AB found that several
U.S. programs were inconsistent with the WTO Agreements, either as
prohibited subsidies or as actionable subsidies that caused serious
prejudice to Brazil.282 Furthermore, Brazil obtained permission to crossretaliate by suspending concessions not only in goods, but also in services
and TRIPs. Although the arbitrator accepted neither the total amount of
damages claimed by Brazil nor the amount of concessions Brazil claimed it
was entitled to cross-retaliate, the decision represented an important
victory for Brazil.283 After Brazil received permission to enact
279. Cf. JORGE A. HUERTA-GOLDMAN, MEXICO IN THE WTO AND NAFTA, LITIGATING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES 122 (2010); Shaffer et al., supra note 217, at 413 (presenting
Brazil as “the most successful developing-country user of the WTO dispute settlement system” in
terms of the number of cases and their systemic implications).
280. The United States started the subsidy program in 1933 with the Agricultural Adjustment
Act. This act aimed to stabilize the prices for cotton producers through various forms of subsidies
and government purchases. Despite its modest beginnings in a single act, by the time Brazil
challenged the use of agricultural subsidies, the U.S. program involved a complex web of regulations.
See William Gillon, The Panel Report in the U.S.–Brazil Cotton Dispute: WTO Subsidy Rules Confront U.S.
Agriculture, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 7, 9, 23–28 (2005). Between 1999–2002, the years right before
Brazil’s complaint, U.S. support for cotton producers in the United States peaked as world prices for
cotton fell to their lowest level in over a decade. Karen Halverson Cross, International Decisions: United
States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil: WTO Appellate Body —
Compliance with Recommendations and Rulings in U.S. — Upland Cotton — Pending Arbitration Over
Countermeasures by Brazil-Scope of Compliance Proceedings, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 110, 111 (2009).
281. Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/1
(Oct. 3, 2002).
282. Appellate Body Report, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar.
3, 2005); Panel Report, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004).
283. Cross, supra note 280, at 113. Brazil had asked for suspension of concessions equal to
$4 billion annually. The arbitrator found that Brazil was entitled to countermeasures totaling $147.6
million for fiscal year 2006 for prohibited subsidies, and an amount based on the calculations going
into that number for future years. The arbitrator also found that Brazil was entitled to $147.3 million
annual for actionable subsidies. Id.

2012]

POLICY AUTONOMY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

615

countermeasures in goods and announced its intention to retaliate in
services and TRIPs, both parties reached a mutually agreeable solution.284
The dispute was significant for the WTO system because it was the first
successful challenge “to highly trade-distorting, actionable, and prohibited
agricultural subsidies under the WTO.”285 Because such agricultural
subsidies are a large part of the domestic program of the United States and
the EU, the dispute can have widespread ramifications. Moreover, this
case shows that Brazil was willing to use this retaliatory entitlement in
order to pressure the United States to remove its subsidies and comply
with its WTO obligations, as well as to use this entitlement in sectors other
than goods where it could gain additional advantage, such as intellectual
property protection. Thus Brazil, drew from its experience as a RP and its
domestic development strategy to create policy space in the domain of
retaliatory measures.

ii.

Mexico

Mexico’s primary focus in litigating WTO cases has been to ensure
market access and equal treatment of its exports in the importing country
and to fight what it perceives as unfair trade measures by its competitors in
its home market. As a complainant,286 Mexico has challenged other
284. Press Release, Office U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., Brazil Agree on Framework Regarding
WTO Cotton Dispute (June 2010), http://tinyurl.com/7skqhwq (last visited Mar. 18, 2012); Framework
for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade Organization (WT/DS267), BRAZILU.S. BUS. COUNCIL, http://tinyurl.com/89va2t3 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). See also Dispute
Settlement: Dispute DS267, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WORLD TRADE ORG., available
at http://tinyurl.com/6ufm7qz (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (describing the settlement between the
United States and Brazil).
285. Scott Andersen & Meredith A. Taylor, Brazil’s WTO Challenge to U.S. Cotton Subsidies: The
Road to Effective Disciplines of Agricultural Subsidies, BUS. L. BRIEF 2, 2 (Fall 2009).
286. As a complainant in the WTO, Mexico has only been successful in winning in litigation
against United States or European Community (EC) measures when it was a co-complainant of
either the United States or the EC against the other. In EC-Bananas, for example, Mexico joined the
United States in a successful challenge against the EC. In U.S.-Offset Act, it joined the EC and other
WTO members against the United States. Mexico was not able to win on its own against the United
States before the AB (U.S.-OCTG). HUERTA-GOLDMAN, supra note 279, at 172–73. In fact, Mexico
has lost the only two cases it has litigated as a sole complainant before the AB, one against the United
States and the other against Guatemala (Guatemala-Cement I). Id. at 174. Furthermore, until 2010, out
of sixteen cases in which Mexico had been a complainant, only six had been implemented. Only two
of seven cases against the United States have been implemented. See Request for Consultations by
Mexico, United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico, WT/DS281 (Jan. 31, 2003);
Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States — Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Imports of
Fresh or Chilled Tomatoes from Mexico, WT/DS49 (July 1, 1996). Both of these cases related to antidumping and were not litigated but rather reached a settlement through negotiation. HUERTAGOLDMAN, supra note 279, at 175. One of the most important cases for Mexico against the United
States was the case concerning sugar. This dispute was initiated by Mexico under NAFTA, and it
spilled over to the WTO. The case started out by Mexico claiming that the United States was
violating its NAFTA commitments of market access to Mexican sugar, and it has turned into one of
the worst headaches for the country. The protracted litigation in the WTO and the Antidumping and
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countries’ trade measures when they undermine Mexican exports. For
example, it launched a complaint against the E.C.’s banana import scheme,
which gave several forms of preference to exporters from African,
Caribbean and Pacific countries over Mexican exporters, among others.287
Similarly, it complained of U.S. labeling requirements that negatively
impacted Mexican tuna imports.288 Some of the most prominent disputes
initiated by Mexico are challenges to anti-dumping duties (AD)289 imposed
by other countries on Mexican products, such as cement290 and steel.291 In
fact, in five out of the six cases initiated by Mexico that reached
implementation, Mexico invoked a violation of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.292 In these cases, Mexico challenged the sufficiency of
evidence presented in the investigation or the methodology applied in
determining dumping margins. Mexico has also challenged countervailing
duties, tariffs and other countries’ measures affecting its exports. In recent
years, Mexico filed a few complaints that address another country’s
internal subsidy mechanisms, especially where that country might be a
competitor in the export market.293
Mexico’s focus merely on maintaining the current free trade regime is
clear. Take for example Mexico’s position in the NAFTA Trucking case,
where Mexico as an RP had an opportunity to expand its policy space, had
Investment chapters of NAFTA all resulted in adverse rulings and hefty compensation claims against
Mexico. For an overview of the complex sugar dispute, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J.
SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 310–27 (2005); see also Sergio
Puig de la Parra, The Political-Economy and the Causes of Compliance of Trade and Investment
Agreements: NAFTA and the Sweeteners Sector (May 2009) (unpublished J.S.D. thesis, Stanford
Law School) (on file with Robert Crown Law Library, Stanford Law School), available at
http://tinyurl.com/7qqtxlf (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
287. Request for Consultations by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United
States, European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/1
(Feb. 12, 1996).
288. Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/1 (Oct. 28, 2008). See Request for
Consultations by Mexico, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2001).
289. Among OECD countries, excepting the United States and the EC, Mexico is the most
frequent user of ADA as complainant (eleven times) and as a respondent (six). HUERTA-GOLDMAN,
supra note 279, at 170–71.
290. See Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement
from Mexico, WT/DS281/1 (Feb. 11, 2003); Request for Consultations by Mexico, Ecuador —
Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Cement from Mexico, WT/DS191/1 (Mar. 17, 2000); Request for
Consultations by Mexico, Guatemala — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from
Mexico, WT/DS156/1 (Jan. 8, 1999).
291. See Appellate Body Report, United States — Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from
Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008).
292. See HUERTA-GOLDMAN, supra note 279, at 104.
293. See Request for Consultations by Mexico, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS398/1 (Aug. 26, 2009); Request for Consultations by Mexico, China —
Grants, Loans and Other Incentives, WT/DS388/1 (Jan. 8, 2009).
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its development strategy demanded it.294 The Mexican government won a
case against a U.S. regulation prohibiting Mexican trucks from entering
U.S. territory, in violation of NAFTA. But Mexico took years to start
retaliatory measures in the face of United States non-compliance.
Moreover, in its retaliation measures, the government selected a mix of
goods by a process that was merely designed to hurt and put pressure on
the United States to revoke its prohibition; it paid no attention to how it
could use countermeasures to support specific domestic industries. Indeed,
Mexican officials forcefully rejected deliberately using these reprisals as a
way to provide a temporary boost to domestic sectors. In their view, that
would be an unjustifiable way to “pick winners” and would open the
floodgates, with every industry demanding that their sector be included in
the retaliation list.295
The experiences of Brazil and Mexico illustrate two different attitudes
towards the use of retaliation. Optimally, the use of a reprisal involves
attacking the breaching country’s products whose exclusion would ratchet
up pressure on that country to remove its trade barriers. On its face, the
availability of a reprisal, which is a legally recognized privilege accorded to
the winning party to harm the breaching country as a way to compensate
for the original injury, can help a domestic industry because its foreign
competitor has been hit with higher tariffs. Although Brazil seems to use
this retaliation privilege effectively by deliberately targeting the domestic
industries it can temporarily promote, Mexico seems reluctant to further
any economic strategy other than hurting the losing country.296 It refuses
to take advantage of this privilege for fear that such protection may
engender rent seeking, even though such a tactic might not be deemed
illegal.

b.

As Respondents

Perhaps the starkest contrast in the trade policy of Mexico and Brazil is
visible in the cases they have to deal with as respondents. Brazil has been
challenged over a wide array of domestic measures designed to implement
294. Final Report, In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, No. U.S.-Mex-98-2008-01 (Feb. 6,
2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta20/truckingservices.pdf.
295. Interview with official at the Ministry of the Economy #4 [name withheld], in Mexico City,
Mex. (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author).
296. One exception to this position was Mexico’s use of retaliatory tariffs on the case U.S.
Safeguard Action Taken on Corn Brooms. After winning the case, Mexico used its entitlement to
retaliate by increasing tariffs on U.S. HFCS (high fructose corn syrup) and thus reduce its
competitive pressure on the domestic sugar industry. The government decided to “use the bargaining
chip obtained in the broom case to increase tariffs on fructose.” Puig de la Parra, supra note 286, at
132 (internal quotes and footnotes omitted). This action shows that this policy space is there and can
be used at will. In the sugar case, however, this temporary relief was not tied to an overarching
strategy or industrial policy to make the sector economically viable in the long term.
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the government’s industrial policies, while Mexico has been targeted
mostly for its anti-dumping measures. This pattern is consistent with the
different trade policies in each country. Brazil has not only enacted antidumping measures, but also implemented a series of industrial policies that
seek to promote its domestic firms at home and abroad. Mexico, on the
other hand, focuses on using anti-dumping measures or other
countervailing duties to offset what it perceives as unfair trade measures by
trade partners. It protects its domestic industries only when it deems that
they are being harmed unfairly.

i.

Brazil

Brazil’s trade policy goes beyond seeking market access and protecting
its domestic industry against unfair competition. Out of fourteen cases as a
respondent, Brazil has faced a couple of challenges to its anti-dumping
measures and one to countervailing duties.
The most prevalent cases challenge Brazil’s measures to support its
industrial policies. These measures include local content requirements,
import restrictions schemes, and export promotion programs concerning
areas such as investment, intellectual property and subsidies.
Consider first local content requirements, which Brazil has used to
promote domestic manufacturing by conditioning the extension of certain
benefits to a foreign exporter who can meet local production or content
standards.297 The most prominent local requirements case involved the
U.S. challenge of Brazil’s Industrial Property Law, which established a
“local working” requirement to grant exclusive patent rights and to
effectively forced compulsory licensing if the patent was not worked in
Brazil.298 The United States deemed this requirement to be inconsistent
with Brazil’s obligations under Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS
Agreement, and Article III of GATT 1994.299 In response, Brazil mounted
297. Brazil implemented such a program in the automotive sector, which Japan, the United
States, and the EU challenged in separate cases, citing several nondiscrimination articles, including
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Articles 3 and 27.4
of the Subsidies Agreement. See Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Brazil —
Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, supra note 52 (where the complainant was
the European Communities); Request for Consultations by the United States, Dispute Settlement:
DS65, Brazil — Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, supra note 52
(where the complainant was the United States); Request for Consultations by the United States,
Brazil — Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, WT/DS52/1 (Aug. 9,
1996) (where the United States was the complainant); Request for Consultations by Japan, Brazil —
Certain Automotive Investment Measures, supra note 52 (where Japan was the complainant). Eventually,
Brazil reached an agreeable solution with all complainants and they dropped their cases. For an
analysis of Brazil’s promotion policies in the auto industry see Mahrukh Doctor, Boosting Investment
and Growth: The Role of Social Pacts in the Brazilian Automotive Industry, OXFORD DEV. STUD. 105 (2007).
298. Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil — Measures Affecting Patent Protection,
WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000).
299. Article 27 explicitly prohibits discrimination based on place of invention or production.
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a successful lawyering campaign during the Doha development round,
which made public health an international priority and made clear that the
TRIPS agreement had to be interpreted in light of public health concerns.
Furthermore, Brazil filed a complaint against the United States, alleging
that the U.S. Patent Code’s local working requirements in Chapter 18 —
“Patent Rights in Inventions Made with Federal Assistance” — violated
Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement and Articles III and XI of
GATT 1994.300 Brazil also argued violation of Article 2 of the TRIMS
Agreement, which contains a national treatment requirement.301 Through
the health campaign, and the case against the United States, Brazil was able
to frame the dispute in its favor and withstand tremendous pressure from
the U.S. government and the pharmaceutical industry to change its law.
Eventually, both countries reached an agreement and withdrew their
respective complaints.
Consider now import restrictions. Brazil imposed import prohibitions
on “virtually all used consumer goods, including motor vehicles.”302 The
most notable type of import restriction was its 2005 ban on retreaded and
used tires. The EU challenged the ban, which exempted MERCOSUR
countries, as discriminatory.303 Brazil justified the ban as necessary to
protect human, animal, and plant life from dangerous tire waste, which
increased the risk of disease transmission and toxic emissions from tire
fires.304 Although the Panel agreed with Brazil’s Article XX(b) argument, it
rejected the import ban on retreaded tires as applied because it was
unjustifiably discriminatory and thus in breach of Article XX’s chapeau
provision.305
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
(1994). Article 28 requires WTO members to protect patent holders against third party use without
their consent. It prevents “third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making,
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product.” Id. art. 28(1)(a). Article
III (4) of GATT requires countries to give imported products national treatment, which the local
working requirement violates. GATT, supra note 51, art. III (4).
300. Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States — US Patents Code, WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7,
2001).
301. Id.
302. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review Brazil: Report by the Secretariat, ¶ 14, WT/TPR/S/212
(Feb. 2, 2009).
303. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports
of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/1 (Jun. 23, 2005).
304. Shaffer et al., supra note 217, at 466. This justification purported to be aligned with GATT
Article XX(b).
305. Despite its import ban, Brazil permitted imports of used tires in significant amounts under
court injunctions blocking the application of the law and also granted an exemption to MERCOSUR
countries. Id. at 468 n. 350 (citing Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 258(b), WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007)). These exemptions undercut Brazil’s
stated environmental and health objectives.
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Despite losing this case, Brazil obtained two important findings. First,
the AB declared that Brazil’s ban on tires was an appropriate measure and
would have been upheld if it was applied on a non-discriminatory basis. It
rejected the EC’s objection that there were other less trade-restrictive
measures available to achieve Brazil’s objectives. Second, the AB held that
panels must consider a country’s regulatory capacity when assessing
whether there are reasonably available alternatives to the measure in
question.306 This means that a developing country’s cost and technology
constraints must be taken into account.
Thus, despite losing this particular dispute, Brazil obtained a valuable
rule change for future cases. To bring the measure into compliance with
the AB ruling, Brazil halted the allowance of importation of used tires by
court injunctions and passed legislation to make the import ban effective
on “all reusable, recyclable and recycled solid waste that poses a public
health or environmental risk.”307 As a result, the protection against
imported retreaded or used tires, which effectively supports the Brazilian
domestic tire industry, is still in force.
Brazil has also adopted programs that have been challenged because
they support certain new industries by incentivizing them to export. The
most prominent example is PROEX308, whereby Brazil provided export
financing assistance at significantly reduced interest rates to its airplane
manufacturer, Embraer. Brazil defended the measure using a variety of
rather creative arguments and resisted implementing the DSB’s adverse
finding, instead making minor modifications and repeating previously
rejected arguments.309 The WTO eventually approved Brazil’s PROEX
scheme after the interest rate was adjusted to a level permitted under the
OECD convention, although it was higher than Brazil’s previously
suggested rates.

306. Shaffer et al., supra note 217, at 467–68.
307. Michael Kepp, Brazil’s Chief Justice Overturns Lower Court, Citing Health Risks from Imported Used
Tires, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1554, 1554 (2007).
308. In Portuguese: Programa de Financiamento às Exportações.
309. For a complete list of the cases resolving the dispute, see Panel Report, Brazil — Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Brazil —
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999); Panel Report, Brazil —
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft — Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW
(May 9, 2000); Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft — Recourse by
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/AB/RW (Jul. 21, 2000); Arbitration Decision, Brazil —
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft — Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil Under Article 22.6 of the DSU
and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000); Panel Report, Brazil — Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft — Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW2
(Jul. 26, 2001).
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Mexico

The cases in which Mexico acted as a respondent offer a picture of its
domestic economic policies. Frequently, Mexico responded to perceived
unfair trade measures by imposing countervailing duties or anti-dumping
measures that were subsequently challenged by the target country.310 Out
of fourteen cases in which Mexico has had to defend trade-related
measures against other WTO members, eight have been anti-dumping
measures and countervailing duties. In addition, Mexico has been sued for
other measures it has taken, including customs valuations, import
restrictions related to technical barriers to trade and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, domestic taxes, and restrictions on access to
telecommunications services.311
Among Mexico’s challenged domestic measures, two stand out as
unusual because they protected the domestic industry for reasons other
than for unfair trade practices and the disputes were actually litigated: 1) a
tax on soft-drinks that used sweeteners other than cane sugar,312 and 2) an
anticompetitive regulation placed on its telecommunications sector.313
Although these cases might look like exceptions, they in fact confirm the
country’s free trade policy described above: neither of these measures were
implemented to further any industrial policy.
Take for example the soft drinks tax dispute. The tax regulations at
stake arose as response to what the Mexican government considered to be
an unfair U.S. trade practice under NAFTA.314 Unable to pursue its case
under NAFTA due to the United States’s unwillingness to form a panel,
the Mexican government passed a series of taxes and bookkeeping
requirements affecting beverages containing sweeteners other than cane
sugar, which the United States then proceeded to challenge in the WTO.
Before the Panel, Mexico conceded that its measures were aimed at
protecting the sale of domestic cane sugar, which was being displaced by
imported high fructose corn syrup, but argued that the dispute was part of
a larger disagreement over bilateral trade in sweeteners under NAFTA.315
310. For example, Mexico imposed anti-dumping measures on high fructose corn syrup imports
from the United States that were subsequently challenged by the United States. Panel Report,
Mexico — Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, ¶ 1.2,
WT/DS132/R (Jan. 28, 2000).

311. See Disputes by country/territory, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://tinyurl.com/eadxf
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (providing a link to the dispute summary of all fourteen cases where
Mexico has been a respondent). See also HUERTA-GOLDMAN, supra note 279, at 112–14.
312. See Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
WT/DS308/AB/R (March 6, 2006); Panel Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, ¶ 4.72, WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005).
313. See Panel Report, Mexico — Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R (April
2, 2004).
314. Panel Report, supra note 312, at ¶ 4.72.
315. Appellate Body Report, supra note 312, at ¶ 2; Panel Report, supra note 312, ¶¶ 4.96, 4.115;
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Further, Mexico asserted a GATT Article XX(d) defense, justifying the
taxes as necessary to secure U.S. compliance United States with its
domestic regulation, of which NAFTA formed part.316 Both the Panel and
AB rejected these claims and Mexico subsequently repealed the tax.
This case was only one part of a complex and broader dispute about
market access for Mexican sugar in the U.S. market and later U.S. fructose
in the Mexican market.317 The dispute initially included antidumping
measures by Mexico, which the United States challenged successfully
before WTO and NAFTA panels.318 As a result of the taxes, three U.S.
companies sued Mexico for undermining their investment interests under
NAFTA Chapter 11 and won.319 The saga of this conflict makes clear that
the sugar industries in both countries are highly protected and that both
governments have a strong interest in supporting them.320 It also makes
clear, in the case of Mexico, that it did not have a good legal strategy on
how to challenge the U.S.’s refusal to adjudicate their disagreement about
the terms of the U.S.’s market-access commitments for sugar under
NAFTA. Whilst Mexico started out as the aggrieved party in the conflict,
complaining that the United States had defected on its promise and was
refusing to even adjudicate the disagreement according to NAFTA
proceedings, it ended up as the villain of the story, enacting measures that
made it vulnerable to challenges in the WTO and made it liable to pay
$110.8 million in compensation for NAFTA investment panel decisions
against it.321 None of these measures by Mexico seemed to have been
Puig de la Parra, supra note 286, at 163.
316. Appellate Body Report, supra note 315, ¶ 13.
317. For an overview of the sugar conflict, see GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT,
NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 310–27 (2005). See also Puig de la Parra,
supra note 286, at 163.
318. Panel Report, Mexico — Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the
United States, ¶ 8.2, WT/DS132/R (Jan. 28, 2000); Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, Mexico —
Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, ¶¶ 135(b)–(c),
WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001).
319. Cargill Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2 (NAFTA) (Sept. 18,
2009); Archer Daniels Midland Co. and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05 (Nov. 21, 2007); Corn Products International Inc. v.
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1 (May 20, 2005), 21 ICSID REV. 364 (2006); see also
Alice Vacek-Aranda, Sugar Wars: Dispute Settlement Under NAFTA and the WTO as Seen Through the Lens
of the HFCS Case and Its Effects on U.S.–Mexican Relations, 12 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 121, 156 (2006).
320. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 317, at 310–27. See also Puig de la Parra, supra note
286, at 163.
321. See, e.g., Cargill Inc., supra note 319, ¶ 559; Archer Daniels Midland Co. and Tate & Lyle
Ingredients Americas Inc., supra note 319, ¶ 304; Corn Products International Inc., supra note 319, ¶
193 (establishing liability only; damage calculation pending or settled separately). The internal
tensions between different branches of the Mexican government were at full sight concerning the tax
measure. While Congress passed the tax, the President invoked special powers to suspend it and the
Supreme Court finally upheld it. Similarly, a sugar mill challenged the constitutionality of a
President’s expropriation decree, wich the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional on due process
grounds. These tensions also revealed that there was not a clear, overarching strategy by the

2012]

POLICY AUTONOMY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

623

enacted as a component of a coherent, long-term industrial policy but
rather as immediate palliatives to the economic struggles and the political
pressures of the sugar industry in the country.
In the Mexico – Telecommunications case, the United States challenged
Mexico’s regulations as anti-competitive and discriminatory and charged
Mexico with tolerating privately-established market-access barriers and
failing to take regulatory action.322 Mexico defended its regulatory
measures, but it did not appeal the Panel’s unfavorable decision.323 In
doing so, the Mexican government used this U.S. challenge as an
opportunity to economically liberalize one of its own sectors, which had
been dominated by Telmex, a powerful private monopoly, by inviting
international competition. This was a decision in the direction of
liberalization, and in this case, it was very likely desirable. What underlies
the decision, however, is not the stricture of the international agreement,
whose interpretation Mexico did not even appeal, but the economic policy
of the country. Again, this case illustrates the trade policy strategy of
Mexico. In both cases, however, none of the measures in question seemed
to be part of a coherent, well thought out industrial policy aimed at
promoting economic development.
One potential objection to the analysis of Mexico’s experience in the
WTO is that this forum is marginal for this country. After all, the main
trade forum for Mexico is NAFTA, and trade with the United States
represents 80% of its overall trade.324 While it is true that NAFTA is
Mexico’s principal trade regime, the features of the country’s legal capacity
and of trade strategy are practically the same in both fora. There is plenty
to learn from Mexico’s experience in the world’s prime multilateral trade
regime. Moreover, the WTO has turned out to be relevant in cases
involving disputes between NAFTA members. Mexico has litigated
disputes in the WTO, as complainant and defendant, against the United
States in disputes that overlap with NAFTA. Thus, even for disputes
concerning its NAFTA partners, Mexico needs to be able to use effectively
the WTO.
A second potential objection would be that Mexico’s policy autonomy
is reduced by NAFTA’s more stringent legal obligations, particularly its
President and the Ministry of the Economy about how to deal with the problems of the domestic
sugar industry in the face of U.S. refusal to grant greater market access and competition of U.S.
fructose in the Mexican market. Puig de la Parra, supra note 286, at 157–65.
322. See generally Panel Report, Mexico — Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, ¶ 3.1,
WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004).
323. See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS204, Mexico — Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services,
WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://tinyurl.com/778wlwh (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (showing
no Appellate Body ruling).
324. Christopher E. Wilson, Working Together: Economic Ties Between the United States and Mexico,
MEXICO INST., WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS (Nov. 2011),
http://tinyurl.com/76h5276 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
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investment agreement in Chapter 11. In contrast to the WTO, which gives
legal standing to States only, NAFTA gives private parties a right of action
against member States. In addition, while WTO remedies are prospective
and damages are computed only from the time of final judgment, NAFTA
remedies are retrospective and require the losing State to compensate from
the date that the measure was enacted. Under NAFTA, a trade measure
might have investment ramifications and thus have a chilling effect on the
potential action of the State to begin with. In this view, what explains the
difference between Mexico and Brazil is simply that Mexico has more
stringent international obligations, due to NAFTA, and is thus unable to
pursue more heterodox economic policies.
It is possible to speculate that the Mexican government feels less able to
act because of the potential investment claims against it under NAFTA.325
But the record shows that when the government has an interest in
defending a particular industry, even in the most indefensible ways, it does
so without regard to the potential investment claims. Even if Mexico had
indeed less room for maneuver, there will be important terrain to be
gained by using the available space. The main point is that what lies behind
the government’s underuse of its policy autonomy is not its international
obligations, even if NAFTA further reduces its space, but its own
domestic development strategy.

4.

The Brazil Aircraft Case and the Export Subsidies Prohibition

As can be seen from the preceding discussion, Brazil and Mexico
pursue considerably different trade policies, development strategies, and
legal responses in their interactions with other WTO members. For
developing countries that are interested in achieving greater policy
autonomy, it demonstrates that building legal capacity to become a RP, like
Brazil and Mexico, is not on its own enough to take advantage of the
WTO system. Legal capacity must be accompanied by a development goal
that could make the RP push for favorable rules. This final Section uses a
specific case to highlight how Brazil deploys a legal strategy to defend its
program and the lessons that this type of lawyering can offer to developing
countries.326
One of Brazil’s most prominent industrial policy programs involved its
support to the aircraft manufacturer firm Embraer. Under Brazil’s export
financing program (PROEX), the government provided interest rate
325. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author).
326. For an analysis of Brazil’s strategy in subsidies and intellectual property, see Michelle Ratton
Sanchez Badin, Developmental Responses to the International Trade Legal Game: Example of
Intellectual Property and Export Credit Law Reforms in Brazil 49 (2011) (on file with the Virginia
Journal of International Law Association).
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equalization subsidies for Embraer’s sales at the amount of 3.8 percentage
points of the actual interest rate on any transaction.327 Brazil’s government
justified this subsidy by arguing that Embraer was at a competitive
disadvantage in the world’s credit market due to the country’s sovereign
risk.328
Canada challenged Brazil’s PROEX program before the WTO, alleging
that it was an export subsidy and thus violated the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM).329 At issue was the interpretation of
two important rules. The first was SCM Agreement Article 27.4, which
accords special and differential treatment to developing countries by
allowing them to continue prohibited export subsidies for eight years after
the Agreement entered into force, as long as the subsidies were gradually
phased out during this period.330 The second rule of concern was item (k)
on the illustrative list of prohibited subsidies in SCM Agreement Annex I.
The interpretation of this second rule hinged upon whether the subsidy
was used to secure a “material advantage” for the subsidy beneficiary or
not.331
The Panel agreed with Canada that Brazil had not met the requirements
of Article 27.4 and therefore could not avail itself of the exception
available for developing countries.332 In analyzing the text of item (k), the
327. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 4,
WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
328. See id. at ¶ 15 (referring to Brazil’s justification of the subsidy program: “PROEX subsidies
simply compensate for higher interest rates incurred on transactions involving Embraer that result
from what it terms ‘Brazil risk’. ‘Brazil risk’ occurs because a Brazilian commercial entity cannot
avoid bearing the additional cost of Brazil sovereign risk when it raises capital or finances a purchase
or a sale. Brazil sovereign risk results from the perception in the market for debt securities as to the
likelihood of repayment on schedule.” (citing Panel Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, ¶¶ 4.94–4.96, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999)).
329. What ensued was a prolonged and highly acrimonious dispute; the dispute was up for
decision six times. It started with the Panel report and the Appellate Body decision, both of which
found Brazil’s measure to be in violation of the SCM Agreement. Canada then brought the dispute to
an Article 21.5 implementation panel, which Brazil appealed and lost. Then, the dispute went to an
Article 22.6 arbitration in charge of deciding whether the suspension of concessions proposed by
Canada, as retaliation, was equivalent to the damage it had suffered. Finally, Brazil brought a second
recourse to an Article 21.5 panel, which decided that Brazil’s modified measure was in compliance.
From the moment that Canada requested formal consultations to the final report, the dispute took
five years spanning from June 1996 to July 2001. Request for Consultations by Canada, Brazil —
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/1 (June 21, 1996).
330. SCM Agreement, supra note 35, art. 27.4. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 126(c), WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
331. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Aircraft, supra note 327, ¶¶ 166–77.
332. To reach this conclusion, it determined that (1) subsidies consisted of actual expenditures
and not of budgeted amounts, ¶ 7.74 (2) subsidies were granted when the NTN-1 bonds were issued
and not when the letter of commitment was issued, ¶ 7.71 and (3) constant and not nominal dollars
should be used for the calculation. ¶ 7.73 In the panel’s assessment, Brazil had indeed increased the
level of its subsidies. Thus, it could not enjoy beneficial treatment under Article 27 of SCM
Agreement, and PROEX was held to be a prohibited form of subsidy under Article 3.1(a). Panel
Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶¶ 8.1–8.2, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999).
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Panel concluded that, even if PROEX was a permitted government
payment, it was still used in a way that secured a material advantage.
Finding that the PROEX rate was indeed lower than the market rate, the
panel determined that there was a material advantage. On appeal, although
Brazil still lost the case, the AB modified the Panel’s interpretation of
“material advantage.”333 Instead of looking at market rate, the AB used as
a benchmark the OECD Arrangement, included in Annex 1 of the SCM
Agreement, although it noted that this was not the only benchmark
possible.334
Brazil subsequently adjusted its program, which became PROEX II, in
order to implement the ruling. PROEX II included as a new benchmark,
the U.S. Treasury bond interest rate, plus a 0.2% spread.335 Canada
challenged PROEX II before an Article 21.5 implementation panel,
arguing that Brazil had not withdrawn its subsidies and that PROEX II
was still not in compliance with the Subsidies Agreement.336 The Panel
and, after Brazil’s appeal, the AB agreed on both counts, requiring Brazil
to withdraw the ongoing subsidies granted under PROEX I and to bring
PROEX II under compliance.337
Canada subsequently requested authorization under Article 22 to
retaliate. Brazil objected to the level of suspensions and referred the matter
to an Article 22.6 arbitration. The Arbitrator authorized counter measures
in the amount of 344.2 million Canadian dollars per year.338 Brazil adjusted
its program one more time but Canada still considered this a continued
violation of Brazil’s SCM obligations. Thus, Canada requested a second
Article 21.5 implementation panel, which analyzed whether Brazil’s
PROEX III program was in compliance. This time, the benchmark Brazil
used was the OECD Arrangement. The Panel declared that it could no
longer find Brazil’s PROEX program to be a prohibited subsidy.339 Canada
decided not to appeal the ruling.340
333. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Aircraft, supra note 327, ¶¶ 176–77; see Panel Report,
Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶¶ 7.23, 7.33, 7.37, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999).
334. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Aircraft, supra note 327, ¶ 181.
335. Panel Report, Brazil — Aircraft — Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 2.3,
WT/DS46/RW (May 9, 2000).
336. Id. ¶ 3.1.
337. Id. ¶ 7.1; Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft — Recourse
by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 82, WT/DS46/AB/RW (Jul. 21, 2000).
338. Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 4.1,
WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000).
339. The Panel found that PROEX III allowed Brazil sufficient discretion to discontinue
subsidies when they conferred an advantage to regional aircraft. Panel Report, Brazil — Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft — Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 5.55,
WT/DS46/RW2 (July 26, 2001).
340. See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS46, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://tinyurl.com/7xhso6a (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (showing
no further appeals).
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What Brazil Aircraft made clear is that what initially looks like an
outright prohibition, such as a measure that provides exports subsidies,
can be interpreted or adjusted to become less restrictive than as first
appears. Brazil managed to turn what initially looked like a very explicit
and somehow inflexible prohibition in the SCM into a more permissive
rule.341 Brazil, a founding member of the WTO, not only did not gradually
reduce its subsidies program to take advantage of the Article 27.5
exception for developing countries in the SCM Agreement, but actually
doubled it. When Canada challenged the program, it took another five
years before adjusting its subsidies to a level that was palatable to a WTO
implementation panel.
Furthermore, an important part of this story is that soon after Canada
had challenged Brazil’s PROEX program, Brazil sued Canada in the WTO
for a variety of measures that Brazil considered export subsidies in favor
of Bombardier, Canada’s aircraft manufacturer. The panel and AB found
that some of Canada’s measures were inconsistent with the SCM
Agreement.342 Brazil sued Canada a second time, challenging a variety of
Canada’s export credits and loan guarantees.343 While most of the
challenges were not successful, the panel decided that a Canadian program
under the Export Development Corporation (ECD), was an export
subsidy prohibited under the SCM Agreement. This dispute went to an
Article 22.6 arbitration that granted Brazil the right to retaliate in the
amount of $247 million.344
Thus, this story shows that, through strategic litigation and lawyering, a
state can assert and use its policy space to advance domestic agendas that it
considers crucial to its economy.345 Brazil experienced tremendous
pressure throughout the dispute and was required to change its PROEX
program, but it did so gradually, carefully testing the limits of the
restriction and moving its measure to a threshold point where it could be
considered permissible. Of course, this does not mean that WTO subsidy
341. Cf. Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and
Cumulative Regulatory Measures, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 153 (2009) (arguing that the Brazil Tyre case
similarly opens up policy space for developing countries).
342. See Panel Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R
(Apr. 14, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
343. Panel Report, Canada — Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft,
WT/DS222/AB/R (Jan. 28, 2002).
344. Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report, Canada — Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for
Regional Aircraft, ¶ 4.1, WT/DS222/ABR (Feb. 17, 2003).
345. This case, which started only one year after the WTO was created, mobilized the
government of Brazil and made clear the need to be prepared to litigate and defend its interests in the
dispute settlement system. It was a “wake-up call” for the government, but also to the private sector
and civil society groups. Shaffer et al., supra note 217. The case became a matter of Brazilian foreign
policy and national pride, which propelled trade relations to the center of the political scene in the
country.
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rules are free of constraints. After all, Brazil had to change its program and
had to spend considerable resources in litigating disputes. However, at the
very least, this case does show that an RP can succeed in defending a
program it deems important for its domestic economic development and
in ensuring that it does not overconform to the apparent restriction.346
Brazil’s lawerying strategy achieved important benefits for its policy of
supporting Embraer. First, it managed to keep the subsidies for aircraft
purchase financing, even if at lower levels. Second, it managed to reduce
the levels of subsidies that Canada accorded to Bombardier, its main
competitor in the regional jets market, by getting the Panel and AB to
declare that Canada was itself in breach of the Subsidies Agreement.347 In
addition, Brazil got permission to retaliate against Canada because it failed
to bring its subsidies into compliance. The case that Brazil brought against
Canada demonstrated that export subsidies are important for developed
countries as well as for developing countries. Finally, Brazil’s lawyering
strategy got Brazil a ticket into OECD forum that sets the benchmarks for
export subsidies that are excluded from the SCM Agreement
prohibitions.348 As a result, Brazil is now an active participant in setting up
the standards for aircraft finance and can more closely advance its interests
there.

D.

The Limits of Strategic Litigation

It should be noted that pursuing a strategy of litigation as means for
legal, but also social or economic change, carries the risk of legitimating
the system by achieving gains that are more symbolic than material. 349
346. This is not to say that Brazil got all it wanted. The panel and AB could have accepted
Brazil’s argument that its program did not offer a “material advantage” and could not be considered a
subsidy. There was also no basis to make the OECD benchmark, which is a “safe haven” for OECD
countries export subsidies, the baseline for calculating “material advantage.” As Robert Howse notes,
this case uncessarily rejected Brazil’s position that the “marketplace” baseline in paragraph (k) “be
adjusted to the needs and circumstances of developing countries” because it was not a special and
differential treamtment provision. This decision is particularly troublesome in view of the SCM’s Art.
27.2 recognition that “subsidies may play and important role in economic development programmes
of developing country Members.” Howse, supra note 65, at 21–22. Howse notes that, as a result of
this case developing countries have put this issue in the Doha Round negotiations. Id. at. 22
347. See Panel Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R
(Apr. 14, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999); Panel Report, Canada — Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for
Regional Aircraft, ¶ 8.3, WT/DS222/R (Jan. 28, 2002).
348. Ratton Sanchez Badin, supra note 326, at 49. But see Howse, supra note 346, at 21–22 (arguing
that baseline subsidies set by the OECD are insufficient to balance the difficulty of finding
competitive access to capital in developing countries).
349. “Rule-change may make use of the courts more attractive to ‘have-nots’. Apart from
increasing the possibility of favorable outcomes, it may stimulate organization, rally and encourage
litigants. It may directly redistribute symbolic rewards to ‘have-nots’ (or their champions). But
tangible rewards do not always follow symbolic ones. Indeed, provision of symbolic rewards to
‘have-nots’ (or crucial groups of their supporters) may decrease capacity and drive to secure
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This may create the impression that the transformation has been
significant and that no further changes are required in the WTO system.
The argument of the paper, however, is that a lawyering and litigation
strategy should be viewed as complementary to diplomatic strategies with
potential “legislative” and institutional changes in the context of
Ministerial rounds, as well as with work in the various WTO technical
committees,350 public campaigns, and whatever other mechanisms
developing countries can find to advance their interests. The project of
becoming a RP and increasing legal capacity holds promise only if it is
inspired by a development strategy. It is the furthering of that strategy that
can work against conformism with illusory changes.
A potential objection to the project of carving out policy autonomy
through litigation is that this is an agenda that only middle-income
countries can undertake. According to this view, only relatively wealthy
developing countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, have the economic and
human resources to devise a strategy like the one I have described. Poorer
countries have other priorities and do not have the resources or cannot
invest them in such a gradual reform.
It might be right that this is a project that only middle-income
countries, with a sizable economy and significant trade volume, would be
interested or even capable of taking on. The list of current repeat players
in the WTO suggests that currently it is primarily these countries that are
involved in active litigation. Of course, this might change if litigation
continues to be the main avenue for reform and poor countries enter the
fold. However, even if this was a strategy out of reach for poor countries,
there are two important points to consider. First, the asymmetries between
poor and middle-income countries are also present in the negotiating
rounds that seek legislative reforms. On this front, it is also middle-income
countries that generally take the lead, have the resources, and are better
situated to promote their interests. This raises a serious concern about
representation of poor countries’ interests in the WTO regime but it is not
a problem excusive to the litigation strategy. The question is whether
strategic lawyering and litigation might ultimately have something to
contribute to the benefit of poor countries. Second, the changes in rule
interpretation that middle-income countries obtain through litigation
would be available and potentially beneficial for poor countries too.
redistribution of tangible benefits.” Galanter, supra note 77, at 137.
350. See, e.g., Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 575 (2009) (arguing that although most academic attention on the WTO focuses on the dispute
settlement mechanism, there are important technical committees that disseminate information,
facilitate technical assistance, and are influential in creating dominant interpretation of open-ended
rules). For a qualification of this argument, bringing to the fore the centrality of states in WTO
committees, see Richard H. Steinberg, The Hidden World of WTO Governance: A Reply to Andrew Lang
and Joanne Scott, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1063 (2009).
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Moreover, even if legislative reform were the preferable tack, the terms
of the new agreements would still need to be interpreted and, again, those
countries with better institutional capacity to be repeat players and to
actively pursue their domestic economic interests would benefit the most.
So, to the extent that their priorities allow, poor countries would do well to
invest in developmental legal capacity.
It is important to mention the work of the WTO Advisory Center,
which provides legal advice and legal counsel to developing countries at
below market fees. The center has been praised for its professionalism and
for facilitating access by developing countries to the WTO dispute
settlement system. The center is a phenomenal resource for poor
countries. It could be used as a way to jump-start and develop a country’s
institutional capability. But the center will focus on the specific case at
hand and it seems unlikely that it will have the long-term interests of the
country in mind. As useful as it can be, the center cannot be a substitute
for having a development strategy. A country may use the center as part of
its strategy but it cannot rely on the center to develop one.
This Article has adopted a state-centric analysis, looking at how
countries may use lawyering and litigation strategies in pursuance of policy
space. The assumption is that policy autonomy can be put in the service of
a development strategy and that, indeed, the strategy is often the
motivation to look for space in the first place. Furthermore, it is assumed
that the international position of the state represents its national interest.
This assumption is subject to limits and future research could complement
this analysis with an account of how the state articulates its trade policy
domestically: which sectors, interests, or groups, are benefiting from the
state’s strategy and based on what justifications? In other words, who wins
when the state wins?
Even if one assumes that policy space is desirable, it is not clear that it
should only be the task of developing countries or that they are always the
best situated actors to expand the flexibilities in the WTO. As it has been
noted in the Article, developed countries are already doing this to
accommodate their interests and the question is how developing countries
may fend for themselves. However, there is no reason to limit the analysis
to states. Future research can expand on how other stakeholders of the
international trade regime, such as NGOs may advance expansion of
policy space either by acting domestically or by further opening the WTO
to their participation.

CONCLUSION
This Article has argued against the commonly held assumption that
WTO legal obligations overly restrict countries’ regulatory autonomy.
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Despite the presence of restrictions, there is still flexibility in the system
for countries to carve out regulatory space for themselves. That countries
can expand their policy autonomy shows that governments of developing
countries have more agency and responsibility than development scholars
typically admit. At the same time, however, the asymmetry of power and
resources between countries does affect their experience in the system and
thus influences the outcomes to a greater extent than liberal trade scholars
usually acknowledge.
This Article provided an account of how countries are creating policy
space in a way that is currently underappreciated in existing academic
literature. This space relies on the ability of countries, as RPs, to make use
of textual open-endedness in legal obligations, to seek out favorable rule
interpretation, and to actively participate in the WTO system through
strategic lawyering and litigation. To pursue this strategy, countries invest
in “developmental legal capacity,” through which governments recognize
the need to make gains in policy autonomy in order to pursue economic
policy goals that may be in tension with the WTO’s free trade objectives.
This Article drew on two case studies to examine the availability of
policy space within WTO obligations and the role of developmental legal
capacity. It analyzed the trajectories of Brazil and Mexico in the WTO to
show two different experiences of RPs. The divergent lawyering and
litigation experiences of Brazil and Mexico reflect different attitudes
towards the free trade regime inaugurated by the WTO. Mexico seems to
have considered WTO membership — part of its trade liberalization
policy — as a strategy for economic growth in itself. Its participation in
the regime has been mostly to ensure market access for its domestic
producers abroad and to defend its own market from what it considers
unfair competition. It has largely abandoned its powers to selectively
promote specific sectors in which it may create comparative advantages
with greater growth potential. In contrast, Brazil seems to have combined
a strategy to promote market access for its exports with domestic measures
to promote economic sectors it considers valuable. When other countries
in the WTO have challenged those measures, Brazil has defended them by
seeking to expand its policy space within the system. In this way, the
experience of Brazil seems to show that, claims to the contrary
notwithstanding, states can take an active role in the promotion of their
domestic industries and their economic future, even under WTO
constraints.
The lesson to draw from the experience of Brazil and Mexico is not that
one trajectory is better than the other. Rather, the lesson is that the
economic trajectory depends, not only on the international trade regime,
but also on the domestic economic strategy of each country. Therefore,
the responsibility of the virtues and vices that one may associate with each
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of these divergent strategies must be placed largely on the domestic
government and the economic policies it has decided to follow.
To say that we should turn our attention to the domestic economic
policies is not to say, however, that the international legal framework is
unimportant. Rather, it is to say that despite the international constraints,
countries can expand their policy space — if they deem it desirable — and
find room for policies they want to advance. The Article recognizes that
there are limits to what countries can do. Not all rules are ambiguous and
subject to favorable interpretation. Not all strategic lawyering will turn to
an advantage either. Moreover, carving out policy space requires significant
resources — material, human, political — that not all countries may easily
muster in order to become RPs. Poorer countries may therefore
experience greater limits — real or apparent — imposed by the
international trade regime. However, to show that countries subjected to
similar international obligations can pursue divergent trade and
development policies is to make clear that there is policy space and that
this space can be put to different uses with divergent outcomes.
This Article has sought to challenge the argument, commonly made by
developing countries’ governing elites, to wit that their country’s legal
obligations “tie their hands” and command them to act in a specific way.
Instead, the Article calls attention to the agency of developing countries’
governments. While recognizing that there are important limits set by the
architecture of the WTO and the asymmetry of power between its
members, the Article argued that there is flexibility within the system to
expand developing countries’ regulatory autonomy beyond what is
currently recognized. Developing countries’ governments should bear
responsibility — and their citizens should hold them accountable — for
the kind of developing strategy they pursue, or refrain from pursuing,
within the international trade regime.

